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sory contingent exempted from the protocols of
the Peace Agreement which ut.a ceilin on mili-::
tarv ersonnel levels.
since the SSTBwasunder the
Vietnamese JGS,and a military organization, the
size of the NSA technical support staff could be
construed as a violation of military ad\~sory personnellevels~
solution: put the SSTB under civilian control.f"
(T8//81)1
Ihad been attempting
this tack for almost five years, but Thieu had
demurred on several occasions, citing a lack of
funds and the exigencies of the war. 23 Everyone
agreed it was a "paper" transfer, one designed to
get around the protocols of the Paris Peace
Agreement.
(T8//8I) On the evening of 25 January, the
U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth
BunkerJ Imet separately with President
Thieu, his presidential advisor, Lieutenant
General Quang, and General Vien, the chief of the
Vietnamese general staff. All agreed to the transfer
of the SSTB to the President's Office. Four
days later, on 30 January, Thieu's Presidential
Decree Number 55 established the DGTS as a
national-level SIGINT organization for South
Vietnam.f"
(8//8I) By March 1973, except for the staff of
technical advisors belonging to the NRV,
Vietnamese signals intelligence personnel now
found themselves truly alone for the first time in
twelve years. There were no more American cryptologists
manning any field sites or performing
any analysis or reporting. Nor were the large
numbers of advisors at the technical centers to
ease the transition to sole Vietnamese operations.
Now, there was only a handful of civilian advisors
spread around the four technical centers and a
large staffin Saigon. The DGTS now had to implement
what it had been force-fed in the last three
years.
I
I
(Sl/Sl) The American outlook on the future of
the DGTS was, at best, guarded. Although the
Vietnamese had made much progress in collection
of communist manual morse and tactical
voice communications, along with some headway
in analysis and reporting, they still had much to
do. This was especially true in regards to meeting
personnel manning levels, making its ARDF
assets effective, and ensuring adequate cryptosecurity
of all of Saigon's military communications
systems and networks."
(8//81) Whether the directorate, in its short
life span, actually succeeded in meeting its major
role of supporting the South Vietnamese leadership
with useful communications intelligence,
a ain is a matter of ers ective.
'--
----' described the types
of reports that were passed to the Vietnamese
national leadership. A daily "Tactical COMINT
Report" was given to ARVN Corps and Division
staffs, as well as supposedly to the Vietnamese
Navy and Air Force Headquarters. Other unspecified
reports and information were passed to
President Thieu and other leaders." However, to
American advisors in Saigon and evaluators from
Fort Meade, it still remained unclear, after all this
time, what kinds of intelligence were being disseminated
and who in the Vietnamese command
structure was actually receiving the information."
(T8//8I) By the completion ofthe American
withdrawal in early 1973, it was/clear that the
SIGINT needs and posture of the United States
had changed as well. Likewise, the role that South
Vietnamese COMINT, as part of the new
American SIGINT plan for Southeast Asia, had
undergone a major revision.1
'--__~----::---~IThepolitical-military
situation in Southeast Asia was reduced in prior-
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