spartans_in_darkness

iOP 5ECRoffUe6MllfFlI*1
The problem with Disco was that the airframe
had to fly slow, distant orbits because of its
radar's technical limitations, and to stay out of
DRVinterceptor range. Its communications suite
was limited, and MiG warnings to Linebacker
mission aircraft often would be lost in the blizzard
of other radio chatter. The Navy's Red Crown
controller, on the other hand, while still limited in
its radar coverage that was based on board Navy
ships off the coast of the DRV, was augmented by
Naval Security Group contingents that provided
SIGINT support. However, Red Crown's best
asset remained its GCI controllers. Even the Air
Force pilots recognized this and often preferred
working with Red Crown.'"
EO 1.4. (c)
P.L. 86-36
(S//SI) When Linebacker started, the USAF,
even with the EC-121T, barely was holding its own
against the MiGs. Losses for May 1972 were barely
in its favor: about 1.5to 1.Meanwhile, the Navy
pilots, with their superior Red Crown GCI and
Top Gun training, were downing MiGs at a rate of
over 5 to 1. However, by June and July the tables
turned, and the Air Force was almost reeling from
the MiG onslaught. In June, for example, MiG­
21s downed eleven Air Force fighters to a loss of
only three. Far worse for the Air Force, the rare
and critical-Pave Knife-equipped F-4s (the laserguided
ordnance precision targeting system critical
for destroying the extensive bridge system in
North Vietnam) were endangered.j'" A major
part of the problem was that Discoa.ndRed
Crown could not see MiGs flying at low altitudes
west of Hanoi, a critical staging area from which
to attack missions in Route Packages V and VI. 12 6
Clearly, something had to be done.
(s//sn In early July 1972, The Pacific Air
Force (PACAF) appealed to the 7th Air Force for a
better MiG warning system utilizing SIGINT. The
PACAFalso wanted the individual warning to be
more useful in that it would include the callsign of
the endangered USAF flight. The commander,
7th Air Force, Lieutenant General John Vogt,
already was on the case. Earlier, he had requested
the NRV to study the problem. The NRV office
tasked the Special Support Group (SSG), I7th Air
Force, at Tan Son Nhut Air Base to see what it
could find.!
""--------_.... IThe team discovered that the
North Vietnamese radar operators originated
azimuth and range reports of MiG flights, which
were then passed to Hanoi's GClcontrollers.
These data were passed over upper HF and lower
VHF voice links which could be collected only by
the Olympic Torch U-2 flights. The intercepted,
live communications could be relayed by radio
downlink to a ground site for processing
(S//S1) For General Vogt andothers,the central
issue was getting this SIGINT directly to the
Linebacker controllers instead of theold method
Page 272 EO 1.4. (c)