spartans_in_darkness

P.L. 86-36
TOft SEe~En'leeMIN"FIH(1
Peninsula) near the Marine base at Chu Lai. The
information was brought to the attention of
Westmoreland's chief of intelligence, Major
General Joseph McChristian, by an NSA representative
to the MACV staff, I
General McChristian informed Lieutenant
General Lewis Walt, commander of the marines
in Vietnam, who planned a trap for the VC regiment.
(8/;,51) The marine plan, known as Operation
Starlight, involved closing off the base of the
peninsula with a marine battalion. Offshore naval
gunfire, combined with air strikes and land-based
marine artillery would pound the isolated communist
troops. Then, another marine battalion
would land on the beach and sweep up the survivors.
On 18 August, Starlight began. Eventually
6,000 marines pressed the defenders into pockets
which, in turn, were hammered by aircraft
and naval gunfire. It was all over in three days.
The marines claimed over 700 communist dead
and prisoners and 127 weapons captured.
General McChristian saw Starlight as an example
of how intelligence can drive operations.I"
Cryptologists in Vietnam also saw this experience
as heralding a new and significant role for ARDF
and SIGINT in Vietnam!"
(TS//SI) However, in the euphoria that followed
Starlight, there were indications that the
operation was not quite as effective as claimed.
Thanh would claim that most of the regiment had
escaped the trap and that the battle had proved
that PLAF troops could stand and fight with the
Americans. Over 200 American had been killed
and wounded in the battle." But more disturbing
than Thanh's claims was what SIGINT revealed.
Within two days of the battle, the First
Regiment's radio network was back on the air. On
25 August, the regimental headquarters had
moved thirty kilometers to the west of the Van
Tuong Peninsula and was again communicating
with its battalions. By 1 September, the net was
back to normal operations. Also, there were indications
that elements of the regiment were
I
involved in an attack at the nearby village of An
Hoa. 18 In fact, the region would never be pacified;
American and ARVNsweeps never rooted out the
communist presence in Van Tuong."
CD) The first large-scale test for Thanh's
PAVN regulars occurred in late October 1965.
During the late summer and into early fall, three
PAVN regiments, from three separate divisions,
moved into position around the Special Forces
camp at Plei Me located about twenty-five miles
south of Pleiku. It seemed to American planners
that these maneuvers were meant to cut South
Vietnam in half. The communists may have been
doing just that. Rear support construction units
were busy extending supply lines eastward from
the Ho Chi Minh Trail into the Central Highlands,
a move that typically presaged extended operations.f"
CD) On 19 October Plei Me was attacked by
the PAVN 33rd Regiment of the 325th Division.
The initial assault failed and the communist
troops fell back and began shelling the base. A
relief column of some 1,200 ARVN troops, supported
by tanks and armored personnel carriers,
headed south from Pleiku towards Plei Me. Seven
miles from the base it was ambushed by another
PAVN regiment and pinned down. The column
finally was rescued by elements of the 1st D.S.
Cavalry Division, which literally rode to the rescue
in its helicopters.
(TEll/SI) After the column safely reached the
camp, the 1st Air Cavalry turned to pursue the
PAVN regiment located in the nearby Ia Drang
Valley. For the next three weeks, in a pair of operations
known as Long Reach and Silver Bayonet,
the cavalrymen chased the PAVN units. The
Americans used their mobility and firepower to
effect, in the process reducing two PAVN regiments
to tatters. Particularly devastating were air
strikes, including the first use of B-52s in a tactical
support role. It seemed to the Vietnamese,
that each time one of their units settled in, an air
strike would hit them. Discussing the American
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