spartans_in_darkness

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attack might have gone unheard can be dismissed.
A review of the DSU intercept log for
4 August showed no variation in Vietnamese
communications procedures which could suggest
that any change or changes, such as new operating
frequencies, callsigns, or procedures, were
implementedjustfor the "attack" thatcould elude
American intercept. 133 As Gerrel Moore, the
officer-in-charge of the DSU on board the
Maddox, observed: "1 can't believe that somebody
wouldn't have picked up something." 134
(BlISFj Exhibit C: 77te ".I\Il'er-Aetion"Report
. f /EO 1. 4. (c)
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:
~u;:) I 1o\r a --
2/O/'IIIIr.11-64
s!' 22'
'D~B1a B.C!'
4 ''''i 54 2242G
Aft.er t.he (']5 b.a4 a,l:ready ltart-a t:o le';I(ttt. to YG"oI. we _bot
down twC' S1S'y plare8 1::. the bliLt:..e !!Ilea. and cor.. o~r p:i..n we.8
dIuu:Jed!. We aacr,;,fJC'ed t'WO Jlh;S and all the :-••t are oka.,.. 'I'he
~8ffSl) With there being no SIGINT evidence
of an attack, and the rest of the evidence from
visual,radar, and sonar sources so unsupportive,
we are left with attempting to explain the intercept
of late 4 August, which was interpreted as an
after-action report. Remember, it was this intercept
which was so critical to McNamara's contention
that an attack had occurred - two of the
fivepieces of his list of "convincing" evidence.Yet,
when we look closely at the intercept, there are
four major problems with theassertion thatit was
a report on the supposed engagement from just a
few hours earlier on 4 August. The translation,
"TlO-64," issued by NSA at 1933Z on 4 August
(0233G, 5 August) is shown on this page.
(g/fgI)The first difficultywith the intercept is
thatit does not resemble an after-action report of
the type which had been intercepted early on 3
August by the Marine element at Phu Bai. That
intercept, sent by T-142 to T-146 and the Port
Wallut HQ of Squadron 135,contained a chronology
of events beginning at 0925G on 2 August
when T-l46 met the three boats from Squadron
135 and guided them to Hon Me Island. The
report noted that the attack against the
Americans began at 1525G,andthatby 1625G,all
the boats had received the orders to break off the
attack. 135
(gN8Il Inthe4 August translation, there is no
chronology associated with the supposed down-
ccnbat .PU"lt. .:.s very lugh Blid ~e are starting out em t.ne ·hunt and.
ic:.TEt .a.l':.lng to] eeecrvc RSB':'\1np-ent. lien az:e very C'CJLf.u.teQt bec"'UIC
t.hey t.h.8Itlve•••w the el'l-.y' pan•• 81l'Lk.
Cal
Hot. 1;!ent.1fi.d.
'&
I'bc: oneny .~p could
• .lIC'. hAve beer.. d--.qed.. aepozt: tbJ,. inf9n11.t.l0n bar~k t.o t:1Ie Uillt.
.e va... to JIl:2bi.1i.•• tlwla.)
(SIISI' The supposecll VletrMmese communist
rMYlIJ afte,.t~on tepott
I
ing of the'aircraft.Thaisno mention of any participating
boats or uni ,except to mention that
two were "SACRIFIC ...ANDALL THE REST
ARE OKAY." The 0nIy\ sense of when anything
happened comes with the beginning phrase,
"AFI'ERTHE 135HADALREADY STARTED TO
REPORT TO YOU." In fact, the entire report
seems incoherent, not the type one expected to
see sent by an officer oP the scene, as had been
intercepted on 3 August. It rambles, mixing
morale boostingstatements with seeminglyrepetitious
references to planes being shot down and
then seeing them "sink.•
£Si!Sf) Secondly, there is a problem~_
translation of a critical; passage: "WJ':~
FICED lWO SHIPS AND ALL THE U6J1....
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