spartans_in_darkness

EO
1.4. (c)
TOI' S!e~~Ti1eOMllffHXl
ting the intelligence to the pilots where it would
be effective. During this incident, the cumbersome,
uncoordinated nature of the warning system,
plus the last-minute absence of a critical
communications relay platform, had precluded
any chance of warning the Air Force flight of its
navigational error. 4 9
NRV agreed and urged NSA to lift all of the
restrictions • from Hammock reporting. In
February 1967, NSA agreed to lift them. With that
decision any target located in the entire region,
China
ff'S//SI) Owens' team made several recommendations,
most dealing with assuring that the
clutter that was clogging the warning system was
swept away. First of all, the ACRP flights were
brought into the warning system with communications
gear that could relay the MiG alerts and
border encroachment warnings. Secondly, the
ACRP flights, like Big Look, were brought under
7th AF's control so that there was an assurance
they would be in orbit when strike missions were
flown.''
Laos
Vietnam
* ","
Hanoi
;..}'
Da Nang
('TS//SI) However, it was the organization of
the warning nodes that got the most attention.
General Owens proposed that a completely integrated
warning center replace the duplicative
effort currently used by 7th AF. The TACC at Tan
Son Nhut was dropped, while a new one was
established at Monkey Mountain - the Tactical
Air Control Center-North Sector (TACC-NS)
which assumed complete control of air operations
over North Vietnam. The TACC-NS was staffed
with technicians cleared for the SIGI:r-,l coming
from the adiacent AFSS site. I
(T~//~l) In December 1966, the restrictions
on the use of the SIGINT were eased further. The
TACC-NS had suggested to the NSA representative's
office that, with all of the additional aerial
radar and electronic warfare platforms active
during strike and reconnaissance missions, the
theoretical and real areas covered by non-SIGINT
sensors had increased to the point beyond the
current 235-mile radius at a certain altitude. The
(V) Area coverClge for Hammock reporting
encompassed in a box from 16 0
00' to 23"30'
degrees north latitude and from 100°00' to uz'
00' degrees east longitude (essentially all of Laos
and North Vietnam), could now be reported.51
('TS//Sf) And with the addition of the secured
KY-8 circuits, it was possible for the senior controller
at the TACC-NS to receive all tracks,
including those from the intercept of the North
Vietnamese air defense communications. The
responsibility for issuing the MiG, SAM, and border
warnings passed to the TACC-NS. The role of
SIGINT was now reduced solely to input. More
importantly, the battle commander, in the person
of the senior controller at Danang, now had all
source information in front of him without any
more restrictions.52
(Sl/SI) Was Hammock effective, though
This is a difficult question to answer. While it is
true that Hammock came on line in December
1965, it was not until late April 1966 that the system
could claim its first MiG kill. This was not due
fOIi SEeREfffeOMINflfX 1 Page 251