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overwhelming American firepower to smash several
large PAVN units. The other view saw Khe
Sanh as a chance for Hanoi to inflict a defeat on
Washington not unlike Dien Bien Phu. 109
CD) The introduction of the Dien Bien Phu
parallel probably was unfortunate for the commands
in Washington and Saigon. There were
some superficial similarities - the communist
troops surrounded both garrisons with superior
numbers of troops, they held high ground from
which they could shell the bases, and both
besieged bases relied totally on aerial resupply.
However, the differences between the two situations
were far more significant. For one thing,
Khe Sanh was not at the end of an tenuous aerial
supply line; it was mere minutes from Allied air
fields. Moreover, the marines could rely on enormous
amounts of outside firepower. Some estimates
put the ordnance dropped from Allied aircraft,
including B-52s, at around 100,000 tons.
Air support was so heavy that it has been
described as a "beehive," with aircraft stacking up
in a holding pattern up to 35,000 feet awaiting
clearance to make their bombing runs. Artillery
support, some of it from army
batteries at Camp Carroll,
some twenty miles away,
added another 150,000
rounds." Relief units, principally
from the 101st Airmobile
Division and the 3rd Marine
Division were only an hour
away by helicopter.
Khe Sanh as a possible replay of Dien Bien Phu.
In the basement of the White House, President
Johnson had a terrain model of the base set up
which he would consult daily for updates. It has
already been noted how the 7th AF commander
consulted former French officers who had survived
the battle. General Westmoreland ordered
his command historian to prepare a study on
Dien Bien Phu and other sieges to see how Khe
Sanh fit into historical precedents. After seeing
the presentation, Westmoreland would confide in
his diary that the entire briefing was "fraught with
gloom." 112 The feelings in Washington could be
summed up in the words of President Johnson to
General Wheeler, "I don't want no damn
D· mb' mph 00.
,,113
CD) However, the Dien
Bien Phu image took hold in
the minds of the administration
and MACV. The press
headlined the story about the
"doomed garrison" and how
the fate of the earlier French
disaster was "casting a long
shadow of gloom over
Washington." 111 And the
administration did act as if
(V) President Johnson and his advisors study the Khe Sanh map
in the basement ofthe white House.
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