spartans_in_darkness

TOIi' 3Ee~Ef;;eOMINT;;Xl
CU) On the other hand, the Pentagon's OGA:
approach centered solely on the organized-rnflitary
forces of the PLAF andthePAVN. This
approach reduce~JheW'ar to a simple military
confrontation between military units and minirnizedthe
sustaining nonmilitary infrastructure.
The MACV staff, led by theG-2, Brigadier
General Philip Davidson, and supported bycivilians
like Ambassador Komer, considered the
other non-main force categories not significant to
the enemy's order-of battle.i" Besides ignoring as
rL--------------------.,.. much as one-half to two-thirds of the enemy's
strengththis narrow approach also-subverted the
military's own macabre measure of progress - the
infamous body count. The US. military counted
all enemy casualty claims against only regular
combat units, rather than applying them to all of
the participating enemy's.forces. The result was a
casualty count skewedsolely against the regular
military units: casualties from one column were
credited to another.i" To the MACV order of battle
specialists, then, the casualty figures told it
that the "cross-over point" indeed had been
crossed and that Hanoi could no longer sustain its
war effort. Hence, MACV's optimism about the
war.
CU) Although Westmoreland and the
Pentagon had won the bureaucratic numbers
game, after Tet, their position would be revealed
as self-delusion. And the administration's
"Success Offensive" would run into the minefield
of its 0\'\'11 making.
(V) V.S. Intelligence and the Start of
the Winter/Spring Offensive
CU) On 1 September 1967, the communists
began their winter/spring offensive with a series
of major assaults against Allied border positions
extending from Con Thien in the north down
through the Central Highlands to Loc Ninh and
Song Be in the III CTZ north of Saigon. Rising to
the challenge, Westmoreland committed more
and more American units to counter the communists'
thrusts. Unhindered by population centers,
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