spartans_in_darkness

"FOP SE€RET,'f€OMIN"Ff,'J(1
bombing mission's profile had too many indicators
which gave it away. Communist intelligence,
by utilizing all sources, such as COMINT,
HUMINT, and simple observation of increased
aerial reconnaissance or ARDF missions, was
able to predict 'with a great degree of accuracy
when and where the strikes would occur. Efforts
at eliminating these indicators, sponsored under
the Purple Dragon Operations Security COPSEC)
program, proved to be less than totally effective
or permanent. No matter what OPSEC leaks were
sealed, communist intelligence seemed to always
find new indicators of the B-52 missions." It is
likely that virtually all of the B-52 strikes during
the Cambodian invasion against suspected
COSVN locations were ineffective. 24
(SHSI) By the end of June, American forces
pulled out of Cambodia and returned to their
bases in South Vietnam. A few ARVN units
remained in the border regions occupying some
of the old communist base areas. However,
COS\"N never really lost control of the units
under its command. A temporary HQ South
Vietnam Front, Cambodia, had been established
by COS\"N to handle the fight in Cambodia. This
headquarters entity assumed control of military,
intelligence, logistics, and rear services while the
(V) Cache ot arms 'Incl supplies captured by Allied troops in Cambodia
various COSVN sections and staffs reorganized
themselves."
(SHSI) By September 1970, the new command
entity ceased operating since the reorganization
of the new military regions under COSVN
was completed. In December, at least half of the
communist regiments had returned to their original
base camps along the border with Vietnam.i"
Sporadic attempts by ARVN units in October and
November failed to drive out the communists.
Although hampered by the supply losses, the
communist units in the Mekong delta and around
Saigon continued to strike at government bases.
CU) Militarily, the invasion caused little grief
to Hanoi; combat operations in the central
Highlands and near the DMZ continued.
American weekly losses spiraled down to 1966
levels. The truly damaging fallout from the invasion
of Cambodia came in the U.S. domestic
scene. The tragic shootings at Kent State in Ohio
and .Jackson State in Mississippi were the opening
notes ofthe growing criticism of Nixon's policy.
Now, however, the criticism was coming from
usually conservative sources: business leaders,
like the CEO of IBM, newspapers such as the Wall
Street Journal, and commentators like Paul
Harvey publicly questioned the
war. Demonstrations over the
shooting at Kent State erupted in
over 1,300 campuses across the
United States with an estimated
four million people taking part.
Congressional opposition finally
coalesced and produced legislation
to avoid any more expansions
of the war: the Cooper­
Church amendment, a bipartisan
effort, prohibited any more U.S.
direct military involvement in
Cambodia without prior congressional
approval. Despite heavy
Nixon administration opposition,
the amendment passed
fifty-eight to thirty-seven.
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