spartans_in_darkness

,46. (Cont Lnued )
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'''I~) 145 & Cadr,,~ Khon i , [1 ui so that when you 'have or-dez-s t hc
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'USH. 27
NSAPAC ~EP VIETN~ ~
tci th r eqar d to orders. t.he 333 ,..d.ll carry out military oper-e t.Lons
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(S//SI) Phu B'li Critic alertinq Desoto patrol to
possible attack
~J±CRhT KIMBO
(5//51) Translation ofthe intercepted oriqinal ofthe
"'ltt'lck" order
stated that both DRV torpedo craft, T-336 and T­
333, the latter of which earlier had been reported
ready to attack the Desoto patrol, were, in fact,
being readied to be towed to either Haiphong or
Port Wallut. This second report carried two
salient points: First, at 1946G (1246Z), Swatow
T-142 reported to Haiphong that the tug Bach
Dang was unable to return to port. T-142 also
included the statement that if the ship [Bach
Dang] "MET THE DESOTO MISSION, IT WAS
TO [A]VOIDTHEM." 110 Besides being a warning
about the Desoto ships, the message also implied
that the North Vietnamese thought that the
destroyers were close enough to shore to be a
threat to DRV vessels, whereas, at this time, the
American ships were far out at sea. In all probability,
the North Vietnamese had lost track of the
American destroyers (an issue which we will discuss
further on in this narrative).
(8//81) The second point of the Phu Bai
report was that at 2031G (1331Z) T-142 had
informed an authority in Port Wallut that the tug
was towing the two craft from Squadron 135. The
analysts at Phu Bai added this comment to the
end of their report which read, "WITH THE MTB
336 ADDED TO ITS STRING, IT AP[PE]ARS
THAT T333 WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY
MILITARY OPERATIONS." So, the boats originally
reported being ready to attack the Desoto
patrol, were incapable of even moving on their
own:
In fact, this attempted salvage of the
(~//~I)
two damaged torpedo boats would occupy the
efforts of Hanoi's sailors for much of the night of
4/5 August. The Vietnamese would try various
methods of getting the two damaged P-4s to a
port for repairs. During the 2300G hour, T-146
was ordered by Haiphong to escort the Bach
Dang as it returned to base. When that was comlap
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