spartans_in_darkness

EO 1.4. (c)
T61i SEeRETfJe6MINT/iXl
aged to seize the first floor of the embassy. It took
American security forces six and a half hours of
fighting before the embassygrounds and building
finally were secured. In a statement typical of official
shortsightedness, an American officer
referred to the attack on the embassy as a "piddling
platoon action." 167
(8;'/81) The first critic on the attacks was
issued by the CIAcontingent at the embassy within
45 minutes of the attack (301959Zj310359GO.
They reported that the building had. been
attacked by a team of sappers. There were 4
Americans, not counting guards, in the embassy
at the time. The first SIGINT-based critic was not
issued until early afternoon of 31 Janua
(310847Zj31154G)
L..- ~~--;-~-~-~The army had
entercepted Cambodian General Staff communications
that gave an outline of the situation in
Saigon and along the common border.l'"
(U) A new fury and brutality came with the
Tet attacks. In various urban centers, government
officials, functionaries, and employees only
remotely associated with the Saigon regime were
slaughtered. In Hue, many foreigners, including
doctors, missionaries, and newsmen from the
United States, Germany, France, Belgium, Korea,
and the Philippines were murdered by teams of
communist security troops. After the city had
been retaken, Allied forces would uncover mass
graves of the victims.
(U) In Washington, the initial reports of the
attacks were greeted with the same tunnel vision
that had restricted its earlier appreciation of
Hanoi's plan. Khe Sanh remained the center of
attention. In the White House, the Tuesday lunch
on 30 January (Washington time) began with a
discussion of the status of the besieged base. In
the middle of the meeting, Walt Rostow was
called out of the room. When he returned, he had
in his hand a flash message from the Pentagon's
National Military Command Center: we are
being shelled by mortars in Saigon. Several buildings
were under fire, including the American
embassy and the Presidential Palace. Secretary of
Defense McNamara said that "The answer to
these mortar attacks is success at Khe Sanh." 169
The next day, General Wheeler briefed the president
on the attacks. He repeated Westmoreland's
evaluation that they were not successful and were
diversionary efforts in preparation for an assault
on Khe Sanh or the DMZ. 170 The same day, the
CIA's wrap-up issued by the deputy director of
intelligence characterized the attacks as harassments,
and concluded the enemy's operations so
far might be preparatory to or meant to support
further attacks in the Khe Sanh, DMZ, or northern
Quang Tri Province areas.'' A DIA Special
Intelligence Summary issued the day of the
attacks put this spin on the countrywide assaults:
This concerted operation may have been
undertaken to:
Prevent any Allied reinforcement
of the Khe Sanh area, where a large-scale
enemy attack is expected; present a show of
strength in the continuing psychological war;
and bolster morale!72
(U) In Saigon, General Westmoreland briefed
correspondents on the afternoon of 31 January.
The enemy campaign, he reported, was in three
phases:
1. Attacks in the highlands, the Cambodian
border and the Mekong Delta, designed to lure
Allied forces from the cities;
2. The current attacks in the urban areas; and
3. The main effort at Khe Sanh and the northern
region of I Corps was still to come (my italiCS).173
(8//81) However, Khe Sanh and the rest of the
northern region near the DMZ were never seriously
threatened by the PAVN. Except for one
fruitless attack on the ARVN Ranger positions in
the complex in late February that had been
detected by the marine intercept site and ground-
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