spartans_in_darkness

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fOil a~eR~flleOMINTN*1
Pacific Air Defense AnalysFis;;..,:,.,F~ac;;;;;:i~li~~~~
Hawaii, Lieutenant Colone
was
assigned to General Manor's sta . W at the task
group wanted was information on the DRV's air
defense system that would define the best and
least defended ingress and egress routes for the
strike aircraft helicopters, and C-130 transports,
as well as escort planes, notably the A-1H
(Skyraider) contingent.
ES//SI) A complex profile of the possible DRV
reactions and capabilities was drawn up. This
included information on the PAVN air force's
command and control, reaction times by SAM
and AAAunits, radar and spotter or observer networks'
reporting times and accuracy, and the
location and status of the DRV's deadly MiG
force. Especially crucial was to know where North
Vietnam's night-qualified MiG pilots were and
what they were doing at all times. After this general
picture the DRV air defenses was drawn up,
then a sector-by-sector analysis had to be accomplished.
Another. crucial requirement was the
necessity for special weather reporting of local
meteorological conditions over the flight routes,
and information of changes that could affect the
mission. The region around Son Tay was notorious
for low-level fogs, mists, and rain during
November, the proposed time of the raid. It was
critical to collect North Vietnamese weather
broadcasts. In fact, weather was a crucial factor in
the timing of the mission: it was Typhoon Patsy,
moving west from the Philippine Sea, which
threatened the rescue operation and forced the
decision to move the initial strike date ahead by
twenty-four hours."
and reporting cells. Security was uppermost in
many of the planners' minds. Even the SIGINT
analysts charged with coming up with the DRV's
air defense profile had details 'of the mission kept
from them. 95
(S/fSI) More troublesome \was the importance
for the Americans not to tip their hand to
the North Vietnamese by assuming any unusual
patterns of activity. For example, RC-135 ACRP
flight, known as Combat Apple, which was scheduled
to support the task group, would have to
work at night over the Gulf of Tonkin, a time
when SIGINT flights simply had not ever flown.
Kennedy solved this by getting SAC\ to establish
such a flight profile in the weeks leading up to the
mission so that the North Vietnamese.would perceive
them as normal.96
ES//SI) Another problem for Colonel
was the proposed transfer of the AirForlo-ce""'l"s......-.cryp------...J
tologic mission at Monkey Mountain near
Danang to Ramasun Station, Thailand. It took the
personal intervention of NSA's assistant director
for production, Major General John E. Morrison,
USAF, to delay the move until early December, as
well as garner anassurance from the Air Force
Security Servicecommander that no degradation
to Danang'soperations would occur prior to that
date. Again, this had to be done without tipping
the reason behind the request."
ES//SI) To prevent exposure of themission, it
was necessary to restrict access tothe true nature
of the mission support by various participating
SIGINT units and sites. On. 26 August 1970, the
director of NSA, AdmiralNoel Gayler, assigned
the covername Adrenalin to the project with
Lieutenant Colone as his direct representative.
assembled a complex and
compart
vork of collection, analysis,
P.L. 86-36
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