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'fOP SEeRE'fll'eOMIN'f....lt1
environment in which it operated. First of all,
usually more than one Linebacker mission a day
was staged. But the missions followed one another,
so that the Teaball system was active from the
beginning to the end of them all, often operational
for as long as eight hours. Of the thirty-six
days of Linebacker missions, Teaball could claim
totally error-free operations for only 53 percent of
the time (nineteen days). In the other 47 percent,
Teaball suffered partial to total degradation of the
system: Olympic Torch was inoperable or ineffective
(out of position or poor weather) on six
days, while radio relay problems plagued Teaball
on twelve days. On two days, both Olympic Torch
and communications relay difficulties
occurred.r'"
(SHS!) The Teaball system seldom operated
in a heavy combat environment. Despite the
image of "wall-to-wall" MiGs that some pilots
have claimed (which may have been caused by
the continuous repeat and relay of initial MiG
warnings), on only one day during this period
were there more than four MiGs active (8
September). In fact, of forty-four Linebacker missions
listed in the reports, 43 percent saw only
two MiGs react, while 36 percent had no MiG
reaction. In only 18 percent of the missions were
there four MiGs opposing the Americans. On
three days when there were no MiGs, the
Vietnamese attempted to "spoof' the Americans
with communications simulating MiG activity.Y"
(U) In the end, Teaball proved to be a most
modest success. Its claims for superiority have to
be balanced against Vogt's stated second major
objective to help "shoot down MiGs." An Air
Force study of the Linebacker operation, called
Red Baron III found a multitude of deficiencies
in Teaball: shortage of personnel with experience
and the necessary security clearances, a dependency
on radio relay aircraft, lack of automated
display equipment, vulnerability to UHF jamming,
a dependency on outside agencies for information,
changes in procedures which confused
aircrews, and security requirements which pre-
vented them from grasping the significance and
validity of the information passed to them.'"
*
*
(U) While the MiG and Phantom pilots flung
themselves at each other over the skies of North
Vietnam, negotiations continued in Paris
between Henry Kissinger and Le Due Tho for the
possible peace settlement. By early October,
rumors out of Paris indicated that Washington
and Hanoi were close to a breakthrough: that the
countries would arrange for a cease-fire and leave
the political settlement to the two Vietnams
through the agency of a "National Council of
Reconciliation." By the middle of the month,
Kissinger claimed that peace "may be at hand."
The bombing of North Vietnam shifted to below
the twentieth parallel. Attention focused on the
travels of Henry Kissinger from Washington to
Paris to Saigon as he tried to herd both Vietnams
into the corrals of peace. However, there would be
one more gasp of the air war in December 1972
before "peace" was finally achieved.
(8//SI) For SIGINT, its ability to support the
air war over those seven years was something of a
disappointment. The expressed ambition of
"extending" the reach of radar was seldom met.
Hammock, Ironhorse, and Teaball, all, to a
degree, managed to provide coverage of Hanoi's
air defense system that could supplement the
radar coverage of controllers in the EC-121s, on
Monkey Mountain, and on board the PIRAZ
ships. Yet, the studies of Hammock, Ironhorse,
and ancillary SIGINT systems such as the QRC­
248 and Rivet Gym, indicated that the North
Vietnamese could find a way(s) to counter
American SIGINT through the application of various
operational security measures or deception
practices. The losses incurred by U.S. aircraft
during the months before Rolling Thunder's termination
aptly illustrated this situation.
(S//Sl) Teaball, on the other hand, was able to
overcome North Vietnamese countermeasures,
*
*
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