spartans_in_darkness

P.L. 86-36
TOP SEORETNOOMINTNX1
OGA
I
(rSl/SI) In February 1962, General Paul
Harkins arrived in Saigon to take charge of the
American effort. The advisory group's command
relationship was altered to reflect a growing
strategic interest in Vietnam on the part of
Washington. Harkins assumed command as the
senior u.S. officer in Vietnam, Commander
United States Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (COMUSMACV), directly subordinate to
the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC).
M.t\CV was now the headquarters of a military
command, while the former assistance group,
MAAG, remained, but it had become a subordinate
element under Harkins' control. I
MACV and its subordinate commands by coordinating
the disparate and far-flung SIGINT operations,
as well as keeping DIRNSA informed asto
what NSA technical support was needed for the
milita elements alreadv in lace.
"---__---'who had served previously in liaison
roles for the ASA and AFSA, arrived in Saigon in
IApril of 1962 to be tbe firs; NRV·I 'i,
(S//SI) However,
impending
arrival created a clou 0 controversy. Originally,
the NSA representative was supposed to have
been allocated office space and living quarters, a
request which provoked a nasty reaction from the
commander-in-chief Pacific, Admiral Harry Felt,
who interpreted these requests as "preferential
treatment." At the same time, Felt was knm,\'TI not
Ito like liaisoo personnj\l
I
I
(rSl/SI) Meanwhile, following General
Taylor's recommendations, a way was sought to
maximize the efficiency of the military's cryptologic
effort. The separate missions of the ASA, the
AFSS, and the marine contingent, as well as the
Sabertooth training program, all required better
administration and coordination. For some time,
NSA had gotten by with rotating civilian overseers
through Saigon on temporary duty (TDY)
missions, but these simply had failed to keep NSA
officials informed of what was happening.P"
Besides that, the responsible DIRNSA representative,
NSAPAC, located in Tokyo, was too far
removed from Saigon to take effective action.
(TS//SI) So, a new position was established in
Saigon - the NSAPAC representative, Vietnam
(NRV), originally referred to as the NSAPAC representative
Southeast Asia.1
----I1 The NRV's
major job was to facilitate support to COMUS-
L...-
(rSl/SI) However, CINCPAC's animus
against liaison tYJes was not the only problem
with whichl
~ad to contend.rA far more
contentious one developed around a plan that
NSA had developed for organizing all SIGINT
resources in the region under its direct/control.
Besides functioning as the NRV, he was/also supposed
to wear the hat of the chiefof the proposed
Joint SIGINT Activity (JSA), Saigon. The JSA had
been put forward as DIRNSA's way of exercising
direct operational and technical control of all
SIGINT resources in South Vietnam and
IThe JSA would work directly with
COMUSMACV staff, receiving requirements from
the latter and then tasking the appropriate incountry
SIGINT resources.f'''
I
(TS//SI) This plan had its advantages, principally
the centralization of resources, as well as a
concrete demonstration to CINCPAC and
COMUSMACV\that NSAwas serious in making
an "all-out response" to/the need for timely SIG­
INT support inVietnam. However, NSA knew
that the JSA would be:a hard sell to the military,
especially the.AFSS and ASA, the latter of which
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