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Vietnamese PT boats would take several hits but
remain afloat afterwards. The Maddox's main
gun director maintained that the ship was never
able to acquire any of the targets during the battle;
he figured he was shooting at the high swells
brought on by the storms." Ironically, during all
of this latter action, the Maddox never fired a
round; its radar never acquired another target
after the initial one detected two hours earlier.Y'
CU) The sonar returns of the supposed torpedo
attacks were later determined to be a result of
the high-speed maneuvering by both U.S. ships.
As we saw above, the first "evidence" of a torpedo
launch by the enemy boats came from radar.
When one of the radar tracks turned away to the
south from a westerly heading, this was interpreted
by the Americans as a torpedo launch. The
sonar rooms in both destroyers were then alerted
to a possible torpedo attack. Four crewmen
aboard the Turner Joy thought they saw a "white
streak" in the water as the ship tumed." Both
vessels had then gone into wild evasive maneuvers
to avoid the torpedoes that were thought to
have been launched against them. It was this
high-speed gyrating by the American warships
through the waters that created all of the additional
sonar reports of more torpedoes. Every
time one of the destroyers changed course, the
sonar reported the distinctive high-speed sounds
of torpedoes. Eventually, Herrick and the other
officers realized what was happening: the rudders
of the two ships had caused the high-speed
returns when they reflected the turbulence of the
ships' own propellers.t"
~Within an hour of the end of the attack,
Herrick relayed his doubts about the attack in an
after-action report. After reviewing the number of
contacts and possible sinkings, he stated,
"ENTIRE ACTION LEAVES MANY DOUBTS
EXCEPT FOR APPARENT ATTEMPTED
AMBUSH AT BEGINNING." 96 Herrick then suggested
in the morning that there be a thorough air
reconnaissance of the area for wreckage. In a follow-up
message, Herrick added that the Maddox
had "NEVER POSITIVELY
BOATAS SUCH." 97
IDENTIFIED A
CU) Herrick's doubts did not sit well with
Washington. Since the first Critic warning of the
attack, which had arrived at 0740 EDT,
Washington had been following the action in the
Gulf of Tonkin. At 0925 EDT, Secretary
McNamara had called the president with the
news of the imminent attack. At 1000 EDT the
flash message from the destroyers that they were
under attack reached the Pentagon. Within three
hours after the attack ended, 1400 EDT,
President Johnson had already approved a retaliatory
strike against North Vietnamese naval
bases to be carried out at 1900 EDT, 4 August
C0600G, 5 August).
CU) Precisely why President Johnson ordered
a retaliatory strike so quickly is not totally clear,
especially when there was conflicting evidence as
to whether it had actually occurred. Johnson was
in the midst of a presidential campaign and his
opponent, Republican senator Barry Goldwater
from Arizona, a noted hawk, would have gained
in the race if Johnson had hesitated or refused to
retaliate. Johnson, even in his pose as a moderate
relative to Goldwater, could hardly appear weak
before a public audience demanding a counterstrike.
9 8 It also has been suggested that when
Johnson first learned of the possible attack, that
is, the first Critic issued by Phu Bai, he decided to
use the warning as an excuse to get Congress to
pass what was soon to be known as the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution."
fSt Whatever the president's own rationale
for ordering the air strike, he required immediate
verification of the North Vietnamese attack
because of the doubts that started to be openly
expressed within the administration. At around
1400 EDT, Admiral Ulysses S. Sharp, CINC­
PACFLT, called the Pentagon with the news that
"a review of the action makes many reported contacts
and torpedoes fired 'appear doubtful' "
because of freak weather, over-eager sonar oper-
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