spartans_in_darkness

TOP SEelitl!TileOMIlHfiXl
(V) Infilhation freighter
amounts were coming with them down the trail
(and, incidentally, by sea) The answers to these
questions would give the staffs in MACV and the
ARVN Joint General Staff (JGS), as well as planners
in Washington, an insight into communist
strength and maybe even help divine Hanoi's
intentions. Minimally, knowing the trail system
and how it functioned would allow for appropriate
interdiction plans to be formulated. Yet, for
the longest time, this insight eluded the best
efforts of American and South Vietnamese intelligence
agencies, including their respective SIGINT
mISSIOns.
(TEll/ElI) Throughout the preceding sections
of this chapter, much use has been made of SIG­
INf reports and technical information to explain
the origins and subsequent operations of the first
four years of the supply and infiltration complex
from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.
Foremost among the insights derived from SIG­
INT was the establishment of Hanoi's role in the
Iinsurrection in the south·1
I
(TS//SI) However, for the first several years
during the American involvement, SIGINT's.contribution
to the infiltration problem was fraught
with seriously delimiting restrictions. The information
it supplied was, at best, episodic and fragmentary,
and seldom timely. It could not supply
any meaningful numbers on the infiltration rates
of men and supplies; the identity and roles of the
communist personnel coming down from the
north were only occasional. Worst of all, the
information was often available/only well after
the fact: I
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