spartans_in_darkness

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1.4. (c)
(S//SI) As a barometer of\f~:s~nseof
urgency, the case oft~epQsitioningand intercept
tasking ofjhe-two technical research ships in
Indochinese waters further illustrates the lack of
an alert posture by the SIGINT elements. It
should be remembered that one of the purposes
for the stationing of the TRS's in Southeast Asia
L...- ...... was the provision for contingency collection or
(U) Westmoreland's military preparations
reflected this emphasis on the threat to the north.
By the time that the Tet attacks started on 31
January, a large percentage of available U.S.
maneuver battalions had been dispatched to the I
and II CTZ to support Khe Sanh, the DMZ, and
the cities in Quang Nam and Thua Thien
Provinces. As of 30 January, elements of the 101st
Airborne Division were in transit to the region.Y"
(S//SO Surprisingly, for all of the reporting
about a general offensive in South Vietnam,
NSA's own actions on the eve of the attack appear
curiously restrained. There is no evidence that
any type of warning or alert message was transmitted
from NSAto any of the SIGINT authorities
in South Vietnam, the NRV or the 509th ASA
Group, any operational centers, such as the SSGs
for r-,fACV, MACV Forward, or 7th Air Force, or to
any of the field sites. There are no entries in the
NOG Summaries leading up to Tet to indicate
that NSA elements in the Pacific were alerted to
the approaching attack.i'"
(8//81) A warning from NSA headquarters
did not have to be a formal SIGINT Alert, such as
was done in the wake of the first Gulf of Tonkin
attack. Such an alert even could have been a less
formal message. However, nothing was sent. As
one NSA civilian, assigned to the Watch Officefor
I Corps at Phu Bai, noted, no warning of an attack
was received from NSA or the NRV prior to the
attacks. There were analysts at the SSG for MACV
Forward who, individually, anticipated an attack,
but their opinion was informal and limited to the
site. 147
emergency evacuation of coastal SIGINT sites
such as Danang. It has been impliediin other
cryptologic historical writings that the \vessels
were to be redeployed to the waters near the DMZ
as contingency collection platforms for the ASA
site at Phu Bai and the navy site at Danang, This
move supposedly was prompted by the signs of
increased communist activity throughoutSouth
Vietnam in late January.l''" However, the-truth
was that the ships remained in the southern, part
of the country, stationed off the Mekong Delta.
There they continued to receive routine tasking
for communications search and development of
new Viet Cong radio nets (notated "VCX").149 The
ships stayed in the area until mid-February 1968,
taking on additional tasking for the communi ­
tions of the 7th and 9th Viet Con divisions,
L..- ...IThe USS O:xford finally redeployed
Ito the north, but not until 19 Februaryj
(8//8I) Throughout January, NSA and field
sites in Vietnam issued a number of reports which
indicated that the Vietnamese Communists were
preparing for a possible general offensive in
South Vietnam. However, the reports failed to
shake the commands in Washi .gton and Saigon
from their perception of the communist main
threat centered in the north, especially at Khe
Sanh, and in the Central Highlands. We will discuss
further this failure when the subject of the
Tet postmortems is taken up.
(U) American military forces were not alerted
to the approaching offensive until the morning of
30 January. It was several hours after the seemingly
"premature" attacks in the southern part of
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