spartans_in_darkness

EO;l. 4. (c)
fOP SE6RE"Fh'60MINliV)E1
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
passed to the government III Bangkok. Sarit
agreed to the suggestion."
(TS//SI) The problem now for the United
States was finding a cryptologic contingent to put
into Thailand. Ironically, despite all ofthe previous
planning for a site in Thailand, the ASAcommand
was caught by surprise with the sudden
change in the Thai attitude, and had no contingency
plan for establishing any kind of mission
there. I
'---
_______-I
IAH of the site's intercept
and technical analyses were to be forwarded to
the Philippines for processing."
An offer by the AFSS to airlift a contingency mission
of six vans and personnel was considered by
the ASA and then dropped when the adverse
impact on SIGINT support to the Pacific Air
Force and Commander-in-Chief Pacific commands
was evaluated.l" A similar offer of a
Marine contingent was studied and then
dropped, since the Marine landing force element
of JTF 116would have a more immediate need for
it. Eventually, an ASAteam was assembled scraping
together personnel and equipment already
stationed in the Philippines.
~ However, the previous plans for the
Thailand sit9 Jwere whittled down even
more. A ThaI-mandate~ ceiling of fifty personnel
was placed on the SIGINT mission. With this
restriction, the planned D/F capability for the
Thailand site was scrapped. Anv reDortine: func- ./
tion was eliminated as welU
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