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compensate for the gap, was equallyunable to
provide the tactical collection support needed for
the evacuation. Even the DGTS' ARDF capability
had been pretty much written off since most of
Unit 17's fleet was grounded from a lack of contracted
maintenance and equipment support. lIS
Defense Attache Office compound at Tan Son
Nhut Air Base and the American embassy in
Saigon. The Marines would be used to secure the
landing zones, while a fleet of Navy, Marine, and
Air Force helicopters lifted out the remaining
Americans and designated Vietnamese KIPs.
(8//Si) In supporting Frequent Wind,
American SIGINT had to overcome two major
problems. First of all, the SIGINT structure in
Southeast Asia, for all practical purposes, had
been dismantled in the two years since the Paris
Peace Agreement. There were no operational U.S.
assets within South Vietnam. The regional, fixed
collection sites, which included the 7th RRFS,
Ramasun, Thailand, and those in the Philippines,
could not provide the type of tactical support,
either of tactical voice collection or direction finding,
that was necessary to support the evacuation.
Also, Vietnamese COMINT, weakened by the loss
of most of its voice intercept capability, unable to
securely communicate with the remaining LLVI
teams, and with its aerial platforms unable to
1// (8//8i) The Frequent Wind planners needed
SIGINT to answer two vital questions: What
would be the North Vietnamese reaction to the
airlift, and would there be any attempt by the
Saigon regime to interfere with the evacuation
To cover these two contingencies, the U.S. had to
regenerate a tactical capability in a hurry, one
that could collect, process, and report quickly any
moves by either side that might affect Frequent
Wind. The solution was to surge the airborne collection
capability in the region. Combat Apple
coverage (RC-135s) went to twenty-four-hour
operations providing VOIce Intercept. The Navy's
Big Look (P-3) missions went to sixteen-hour
coverage for North Vietnamese naval reaction to
the evacuation. Eight land sites were engaged to
monitor Hanoi's activities: the ASA (USM-7) and
AFSS (USA-29) missions at Ramasun.l
(8//81) SIGINT's most useful contributionto
the evacuation came from a rather unique.task:
the Olympic Torch airborne collection mission
acted as a real-time relay (and monitor) for the
U.S. helicopter pilot's communications with the
Airborne Battlefield Command .and Control
Center. At the same time, the Olympic Torch
ground elementl I also issued
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