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(U)Notes
1. (C) James S. Olson and Randy Roberts, Where
the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam 1945 to 1990
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), 118.
2. (U) James Bond and Sybil Stockdale, In Love
and War (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 19.
3. (U) Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The
Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Time
Books, 1995), 134-135. However, in the introduction to
the paperback edition of In Retrospect, McNamara
pulls back a bit from his traditional certainty.
4. (U) Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P.
Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam
Conflict, Vol II: From Military Assistance to Combat,
1959-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical
Center, 1986),440-442.
5. (U) Edwin Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the
Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 199-200.
6. ('is//8!)I I'The Gulf of Tonkin
Incident," Cryp tolog, February-March 1975, 8-10;
"Tonkin Gulf: The Untold Story of the 'Phantom
Battle' that Led to War," U.S.Neuis and World Report,
July 23,1984,84. (S/lSI) The source of this quote was
a 20 January 1972 meeting between the Deputy
Director NSA, Dr, Louis Tordella, and the Chief of
Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Carl
Marcy. In that meeting Dr, Tordella conceded that the
intercept of 4 August could. refer to the 2 August
attack. Dr. Tordella could not produce the "original"
version of the report in question. "Reading file of the
Deputy Director," July-December 1971, NCA ACC#
25853 and similar file, January-July 1972, NCA ACC#
25854.
7. (U) Marolda, 442.
8. (U) McNamara, 134; Lyndon B. Johnson,
Vantage Point: Perspectives ofthe Presidency 1963­
1969 (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1971),
114-115.
9. (U) McNamara, 130.
10. (U) Marolda, 394-395.
11. CU) Ibid., 395.
12. (U) McNamara, 130.
13. (U) Marolda, 398.
14. (U) Ibid., 404.
P.L. 86-36
15. Cf8//SI) William Gerhard, In the Shadow of
War (To the Gulf of Tonkin), Cryptologic History
Series, Southeast Asia, June 1969, National Security
Agency, 51.
16. (T8//S1) OlC USN-467 Yankee. "SIGINT
Operations Report, Desoto February/March Patrol,
Submission of," 23 August 1961, NSG Archives, Box 7
file 32316. Direct Support Operations Pacific 1964;
2/0/VHN/TOl-64, 021943Z March 1964.
17. (rS//SI) Gerhard, 51. Naval DSDs used the
SIGAD DSN-467 as a generic designator for their missions.
Each specific patrol received a letter suffix for its
duration. The next mission would receive the subsequent
letter in an alphabetic sequence.
18. (g//SI) HQ NSAPAC to DIRc\TSA, 2620202
August 1964.
19. (TS//SI) DSN-27, "Standard Operating Procedures
for Support of August 1964 Desoto Patrol," 28
July 1964.
20. ~ CINCPAC, 1402032 July 1964.
21.~Ibid.
22. (rS//8l) See 3/0/VHK/T24-60, 20 .Iuly 1960
and 3/0/VHM/TlO-60, 28 July 1960, among others.
23. 2/G9/VHM/R28-64, 10 June 1964, inter alia;
see SecretArmy, Secret vVarby S. Tourison for a complete
recounting of these doomed missions.
24. (S//8I) NSACSS MACV~ ITiger,6.
25. (8/)'81) Ibid., Appendix A-I.
26. (8//SI) Ibid., A-2.
27. (g//gn Ibid., A-3.
28. (U) Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam
Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968 (Center for
the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
1998),46.
29. (D) McNamara, 133; Moise, 22.
30. (U) Olson and Roberts, 117.
31. (U) Moise, 25; Young, 115.
32. (S//SI) 2/Q/VHN/Tl3-64, 2310062 July
1964.
33. (S//8n 2/Q/VHN/T76-64, 0106522 July
1964.
34. (g//SI) 2/0jVHN/R03-64, 8 June 1964.
35. (D) Moise, 25.
36. (Tg//SI) Gerhard, 112; also, see DIRNSA
08006/02,0216152 August 1964.
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