spartans_in_darkness

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105. CD) Shulimson, 65; Under Project Dump
Truck, the Air Force dropped hundreds of acoustic and
seismic sensors from helicopters during the siege.
Staaveren, 290-292.
106. (S//SI) Lukacs, 59. CS/lSI) Interview with
Colonel David F. LowndsDMSC, January 1969,
DSASAInterview, 146-47.
107. (S//SI) Ibid., 13, 15. Interestingly, in early
December 1967, General Westmoreland had ordered
that the P2V Ceflien Lion aircraft be prepared to-conduct
active communications jamming of communist
units surrounding Khe Sanh. The planes, which had
the capability, were reconfigured for the ECM mission,
but were never used. Interview conducted bv
"---_...with Colonel William T. Riley, Jr., Commander
509th ASA Group, 13 March 1973, NSASoutheast Asia
History Project.
108. CD) Westmoreland, 162-163.
109. CD) Shulimson,65; Karnow, 541.
1l0. CD) Captain Moyers S. Shore II, DMSC, The
Battle for Khe Sanh CWashington, D.C.: Historical
Branch, G-3 Division, HQ DSMC, 1969), 90, 145.
111. CD) Davidson, 552; Karnow, 541.
112. CD) Shulimson, 66; A further indication of the
seriousness in which the American command viewed
Khe Sanh can be seen in some of the options considered
for its defense. Shortly after Khe Sanh was invested
by the communist forces, General Westmoreland
ordered a secret lVIACV study to consider the use of
atomic weapons in the defense of the base. Since the
region was lightly populated, civilian casualties would
be light. Therefore, the use of a tactical nuclear weapon
might just send a message to Hanoi. Later, in early
February, President Johnson had considered the use
of such weapons. in Vietnam. He asked General
Wheeler if he believed that the situation in Vietnam
would ever warrant the use of such weapons. Wheeler
thought that the need would never arise, but he asked
Westmoreland, Who surprised both the president and
the chairman with his reply that either nuclear or
chemical weapons might have to be used at Khe Sanh.
This situation recalls to mind similar considerations
for Operation Vulture during the siege of Dien Bien
Phu. See Davidson, 564-565 and Chapter 1, 39-40.
CD) Se~ 1581-2.
113. CD) Karnow, 541.
114.~) Lukacs, 57.
115. fSt Lukacs, 58, as quoted from DIA OIS, 23
January 1968.
116. (S//SI) Gen. Wheeler INFO 'White House, FM
Gen Westmoreland, 291044Z, LBJ Library, SC-NLJ­
012/87 B.
117. CD) Shulimson, 67.
118. CD) Ronnie Ford, 106.
119. CD) Ibid., 108.
120. (TS//SI) Draft "Tet Offensive," CCH Series
VIII.19 Folder 3, undated, 9.
121. ·fU;HSB Ibid., 10.
122. CD) Sheehan, 707.
123. CD) Harold Ford, 115; Wirtz, 137.
124. CD) Wirtz, 202.
125. E~//~I) 08230lZ Feb 1968, DIRNSA to SSG
DIA, B6-61, "Reflections of Forewarning of
Vietnamese Communist Offensive Initiated 29
January," CCH Series VIII. 19 Folder 8.
126. (8//81) 2/0/VCM/R32-68, 25 January 1968
2332Z.
127. E~//gI)) For those interested, these reports
are (Serial and DTG): 2/0/VCM/R32-68, 25 January
68 2332Z and Follow ups 1-10, Last Follow-up Dated
30 January 68 2155Z; 3/0,e:]R16-68, 18 January
2120Z; 3/0c=JR17-68 1
19 January 2100Z;
2/0/VCM/R13-68, 17 January 68, 20l4Z;
2/0/VCM/R14-68, 17 January 68, 2144Z;
2/0/VCM/R19-68, 1623Z; 2/0/VCM/R20-68, 19
January 68, 2151Z; 2/0/VCM/R25-68, 19 January 68,
2148Z; 2/0/VCM/R27-68, 24 January 68, 1714Z;
2/0/VCM/R28-68, 24 January 68, 1828Z;
2/0/VCM/R29-68, 24 January 68, 2159Z;
3/0r=JR23-68, 26 January 68; 3/0,e:]R24-68,
28 Janua 68; 3 ° 25-68, 29 Janua •68.
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