spartans_in_darkness

iUPSECRETIICUMINTilX I
'EO 1. 4. (c)
demonstrated at the time that the release of technical
information on VC communications to
Saigon could not have been connected with the
communications change, the attitude persisted in
the minds of U.S. SIGINT leaders and advisors to
the Vietnamese that there was a serious and systemic
problem with Saigon's security. This was an
opinion grounded in the knowledge that
American intelligence and counterintelligence
elements had accumulated over the years about
lax Vietnamese securi ' ractices.
(TS//Sn However, security problems continued
to plague the ARVNCOMSECsystem. In July
1961
Imessage to
thee b HQ In the western Nam Bo region,
revealed instructions to an agent on how to contact
a cipher clerk working for the ARVN 21st
Division stationed at Can Tho. 50
(TS//SI) One of the most bizarre cases
occurred in late 1962. The head of the Vietnamese
Telecommunications Command,
L.- ---lIwas dismissed after it was
discovered that a junior officer he was sponsoring
was, in fact, a member of a VCcell. In a byzantine
twist, this same junior officer purportedly also
1\ was a double allent for I
I
1////
(TS//SI) As for the COMINT organization, it
was no secret that its/security system was lax;
whether the continuous compromise of COMINT
was due to poor security or an attempt to gain a
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EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d) Page 381