spartans_in_darkness

l'QP 5lIiSRIil'lISQMIPll'HX1
(8//Sn On 2 August, the SIGINT system performed
admirably when it provided sufficient
warning to the Maddox to allow it to defend itself
against the attack by the three DRV torpedo
boats. At the same time, the American cryptologists
were able to observe the DRV naval C3I
system in action. From this they should have
developed a profile from which further timely
warnings could be deduced. During 3 August,
both sides maintained a distant watchfulness,
though tensions remained high - high enough,
perhaps, for the field site at Phu Bai to confuse
salvage operations around the island of Hon Me
for a pre-attack concentration of forces.
G~//SI) The 4 August incident began in the
early afternoon due to a significant error in analysis
by the Marine contingent at Phu Bai. This mistake
set in the minds of the crew of the two
destroyers the idea that they shortly would be
attacked. This error of interpretation by the
Marine unit at Phu Bai was a mistake, as we have
seen, which was not committed by the navy site at
San Miguel. Nor was the Critic transmitted by
Phu Bai questioned or corrected at NSA. This may
have been in line with an unspoken policy of not
second-guessing field sites since they were "closer"
to the action. However, under Critic procedures,
Phu Bai had to supply the technical information
upon which it based its alert. When the
discrepancy between what the intercept actually
said and what the Marine detachment reported
became known, NSA should have cautioned the
recipients of the Critic. However, this did not
happen.
(8//S1) Three hours later, at almost the same
moment that the American destroyers opened
fire on the approaching radar return, Phu Bai
issued another report which stated that the specific
boats, which had been identified as being
readied for an attack, in reality, were to be towed
to Haiphong for repairs. This salvage operation
would be the subject of several more reports during
the rest of the evening of 4 August. Since no
other boats were referenced in the original
"attack" message, the cryptologists at NSA found
themselves without any SIGINT evidence supporting
the reports of an ambush. The Phu Bai
reports had effectively cancelled out the original
Critic. However, the response by NSA was to
counter the SIGINT evidence with an unfounded
speculation that the boats the Desoto patrol
thought were attacking it came from Quang Khe.
And it has been demonstrated how impossible
this scenario was.
(S//~I) It also has been established that none
of the C3I associated with DRV naval attack of 2
August was present on 4 August. Aside from sporadic
North Vietnamese coastal tracking, which
ended hours before the two destroyers turned
east, there was no intercept to suggest the North
Vietnamese had anything more than the usual
interest in the two ships. Nor, for that matter, was
there any intercept of any DRV naval communications
which suggested in any manner that an
attack was planned, much less that one actually
was occurring. In fact, Hanoi seemed more interested
in warning its boats of the patrol's presence,
viewing the Americans as a threat to its navy. For
the cryptologic community, this lack of any attack
C3I is one of the most critical points of the Gulf of
Tonkin crisis. Yet, NSA never addressed the issue
in any reports or activity summaries it published
concerning the 4 August incident.
(S//SI) Instead, NSA would issue summaries
with scattered tidbits of contentious and unreferenced
intercept ("Khoai had met the enemy" and
the purported aerial tracking) to support the
notion that an attack had been planned and that
it had been carried out. The extensive amount of
SIGINT evidence that contradicted both the initial
attack order and the notion that any North
Vietnamese boats were involved in any "military
operations," other than salvage of the two damaged
torpedo boats, was either misrepresented or
excluded from all NSA produced post-incident
summaries, reports, or chronologies. NSA's failure
to deal with both issues, the lack of any attack
C3I and the contradictory SIGINT, especially
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