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alert codes was developed that the pilots could
understand quickly. Another problem for the
AFSS was the shortage of qualified linguists to sit
the intercept positions in the aircraft. Because the
ACRPs were to operate for three days prior to the
actual Bolo operation, crew exhaustion was a real
possibility.55
(SHSI) On 2 January 1967, Bolo kicked off.
Bad weather forced a one-hour delay and grounded
about halfof the participating aircraft. Still, the
F-4s took off from their Thai bases and streaked
into North Vietnam. The Phantom pilots and
jamming pods performed perfectly. To the North
Vietnamese they looked and sounded like several
waves of F-105s. However, the weather added its
own problems. The North Vietnamese reaction
was sluggish; an American air strike in the poor
weather may have surprised them. As the first F­
4s arrived in the target area, the Silver Dawn controller
issued his first MiG warning, but no MiGs
were seen. The second flight arrived just as the
MiGs came in. The surprise was nearly complete:
AFSSlinguists overheard the MiG pilots frantically
calling their GCI controller with the news that
the sky "was filled with F-4s." 56
CU) The result was an overwhelming victory.
Eleven MiGs piloted by the Vietnamese, fresh
from training in the Soviet Union, had flown into
the melee expecting to meet the F-105s. Instead,
in about twelve minutes, seven went down in
flames. The F-4s held all of the advantages: tactical
surprise, a superior combat position, numbers,
and the initiative brought on by the deception.
However, the bad weather and poor communications
kept the second group of Americans
from catching the MiGs as they returned to their
bases. In the mix of planes in the air, the
Americans needed visual identification, but the
clouds prevented that."
CU) Despite the circumstances of the weather,
Bolo had been a rousing success. The severity of
the losses caused the North Vietnamese to reduce
their fighter reactions to American missions. The
SIGINT contribution had been valuable, especially
as an example of timely tactical support.
Surprisingly, though, this type of mission was
never done again, at least on a scale approaching
Bolo. On 6 January, two F-4s imitated the flight
plan of a reconnaissance aircraft and bagged two
more MiGs. But that would be the end of the
deception operations. The JCS seemed interested
in the idea, but Rolling Thunder planners, and
even the 7th Air Force command, always claimed
that MiG-killing operations were not a primary
objective, only a "bonus.v'" Also, there was the
belief that the Vietnamese would be wary of a
similar deception operation. The cost in men,
time, and machines taken away from Rolling
Thunder was high - about 100 planes for at least
three days. When one considers that the MiG
threat was still minor, accounting for only 3 percent
of U.S. air losses in 1966, and 8 percent in all
of 1967, the cost in aircraft and crews removed
from Rolling Thunder appeared too high for the
marginal return. CIt would not be until 1968 that
the MiGs began to cause a substantial proportion
of U.S. losses - 22 percent - and this may have
been caused more by the relative effectiveness of
on-board ECM systems which lowered the kill
rates for the SAMs.)
(U) The Battle Joined:
Air Combat to the Bombing Halt,
January 1967-March 1968
(SHSI) After the losses from the Bolo operations,
the North Vietnamese MiGs again were
held back and refused to engage the American
aircraft. SIGINT detected distinct changes in
Hanoi's tactics as it experimented with a variety
of flight formations and tactical approaches
against the American attack formations. The
MiG-21s tried out four-flight formations with
approaches from ahead and behind the
Americans. A few attack runs succeeded in causing
the Americans to prematurely drop their ordnance.
However, the kill ratio continued to be
heavily in the Americans' favor. For the first six
months of 1967, the U.S. downed fifty-four MiGs
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