spartans_in_darkness

TOP SEORETh'OOMltfFHX1
mission was expanded. First of all, the commander,
Seventh Fleet, wanted the patrol to move in
closer than the original twenty-mile limit - as
close as twelve miles. Additionally, the Desoto
mission was expanded to include a broader collection
of "all-source intelligence," namely, photographic,
hydrographic, and meteorological
information.to
(D) In mid-January 1964, COMDSMACV
requested that the Desoto patrol scheduled for
February (DSS Radford, DD-446) be designed to
provide the forthcoming OPLAN-34A program
with critical intelligence regarding North
Vietnam's ability to resist its projected commando
operations. However, in this case, the
Radford's mission was canceled so as to not interfere
with OPLt\N-34A missions planned for the
first two weeks of February. 11
(D) This is an important point, although a
subtle one, for understanding the events of 2 to 4
August. Inasmuch as there was an interworking
between the two programs, and this remained a
point of contention in later congressional hearings,
as well as a source for speculation by the
press, the Desoto mission remained merely one of
collection of intelligence which could be of use to
the OPLt\N-34A planners and commanders back
in Danang and the Pentagon. There was no direct
operational connection between the two programs.
They were managed under separate
offices and were not known to coordinate mission
planning, except for warnings to the Desoto
patrol to stay clear of 34A operational areas. At
least that was the understanding back in
Washington."
(D) In early July, General Westmoreland
requested more intelligence on Hanoi's forces
which were capable of defending against an
expanded OPLAN-34A program. Specifically,
Westmoreland required intelligence on the DRV's
defenses in those areas targeted for July operation
- Hon Me, Hon Nieu, and Hon Matt Islands,
as well as the area around the port of Vinh Son,
south of the islands. In response, Admiral Sharp,
CINCPAC, issued a new directive for a Desoto
patrol whose purpose was "determining DRV
coastal patrol activity." 13
(D) That the two missions might run up physically
against one another was a consideration at
both MACV in Saigon and CINCPAC (and CINC­
PACFLT) in Honolulu. But Westmoreland
assured the navy commanders that as long as the
Desoto patrol stayed within its schedule and area
of operations, there would be no problem.
Westmoreland added that all the Studies and
Observations Group (SOG), which ran the
OPLAN-34A missions, needed in the way of an
alert, was thirty-six hours' notice of any change.
0'
9'
Laos
106'
I
Gulf
of
Tonkin
\......:~
108"
I
Dtlinang
-:
109'
I
o
tH",,;
~.
(U) Gulfof Tonkin region of interest to OPLAN-34A