spartans_in_darkness

P.L. 86-36 EO 1.4. (c)
Te~ SEeRETNeeMltfT/{X1
(Sl/SI) Five days before the raid, Colonel
I ~ew to Danang, which was his headquarters
lor the operatiOj1·(ds:Cia~ iPSCOM
link was set up between and the
National Military Comma en er at the
Pentagon. At the other end was the NSA representative
to the Defense Department at the time,
Milt Zaslow, who was to keep apprised a select
group of defense department officials. The day
before the raid, all SIGINT sites and units supporting
Adrenalin were alerted to be "especially
watchful for reflections/reaction to U.S. operations
north of 19 [degrees] N with particular
attention being paid to any NVNI
~oreknowledge
of the activity." 99
(8//8I) Airborne SIGINT support consisted of
two missions. The first was College Eye, the EC­
121T airframe which was modified to carry the
Rivet Gym equipment, the special quick-disconnect
SIGINT collection package. Besides the SIG­
11','1' system, College Eye served as the primary
source for MiG warnings, using the APX-83
Identification Friend Foe (IFF) gear, which was
capable of interrogating the North Vietnamese
fighter IFF systems.'"
(8//8I) The other platform was the USAF's
Combat Apple. These aircraft had first appeared
in Southeast Asia in 1967 as the replacement to
the C-130 Commando Lance program. Combat
Apple was flown in the RC-135, which was one of
several military versions of the Boeing 707 commercial
jetairliner. The payoff 'with the RC-135
was its capabilities as an aircraft: speed (500
knots), altitude (30,000 feet and above), and
endurance (twelve hours on station) which
allowed for collection and communications capabilities
superior to anything else in the region.
Combat Apple had two missions in support of the
strike group: MiG warning and monitoring the
Task Group's communications.''
(U) The timetable for the operation was
moved up one day because of the approach of
Typhoon Patsy from the west. Patsy had already
struck the Philippines on 19 November and
threatened the South China Sea and Gulf of
Tonkin region. The typhoon's reach could affect
the weather over the ingress route for the aircraft
of the commando group. Clear skies were needed
for the ingress refueling, and there was a need for
moonlight for the assault force once they hit the
POW camp. Besides, if the sea was too choppy,
the navy's diversionary strike would have to be
cancelled.
ffSt At about nine o'clock (2100G) in the
evening of 20 November, the troops of the strike
force lifted off from Takhli Royal Thai Air Force
r
CHINA />. .1...r-....;
'1 \ '\ NOflTH ViETNAM .... t..,
l. v ':\ I \..'1 ..... ~
BUHMA ).r,-.~ .
\ "\'\,.
" ::>
') '-.
THAILAND ,LAas ~
~ ,..J
/ .......... _ .....-.,/ ~".r ......J r'
; -"""j \
r' \
'.( CAMBODIA
1\
...... .
i
, ,,1-'"
,....",.-""\ .,~
) .......
/.J
t SOUTH VIETNAM
(V) Routes ofthe Son T