spartans_in_darkness

EO
1.4. (c)
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37. ral Histo T interview wit
'-- ---INavy enlisted Vietnamese linguist, 22
December 1987, NSA OH 33-87, 8; Oral History interview
with Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake DSAF,
Director NSA, 1962-1965,5 June 1972, NSA OH -72, 5
June 1972, 3-4.
38. ('f'~//~l) DIR.'JSA, 070118Z August 1964.
39. (~//gI) 2/Q/yHN/R24-64, 310922Z July
1964.
40. (n;//gI~ IoH33~87.
41. (8//eI) 2/G11/yHN/ROI-64 Spot Report,
011635Z August 1964; (TSIISI) OlC DSN 467
November. "July-August 1964 Desoto Patrol SIGINT
Operations Report," Serial 0003, 23 August 1964.
42. (S//Sl) 2/Q/yHN/T26-64, 01924Z August
1964; 2/Q/VHN/T137-64, 080216Z August 1964.
43. (~//SI) 2/Q/VHN/T130-64, 050827Z August
1964.
44. (8//8l) 2/Q/VHN/R27-64, 012152Z August
1964; FLWP Nr.1 to 2/Q/VHN/R27-64.
45. (S//e!) 2/G11/VHN/R02-64, 020745Z August
1964.
46. (8//8!) DIRNSA, "Possible Planned Attack by
DRV Navy on Desoto Patrol," B205/981-64, 020302Z
August 1964; NSA Command Center Record of Events,
2 August 1964. The navy intercept site
'--_---Ihad the responsibility for relaying Criticomm
messages to the DSD aboard the Maddox. However,
the initial Critic for 2 August was NOT passed until
much later. NCA ACC# 45582, H04-030l-4.
47. (S//Sl) CRITIC, DSN-27to DIRNSA, 020444Z
August 1964; 2/G11/VHN/R02-64, 020745Z August
1964.
48. (Sl/SI) Ibid.
49. (Sl/SI) 2/Gll/yHN/R06-64, 022127Z August
1964.
50. (8//8!) 2/Q/VHN/T135-64 050950Z August
1964.
51. (D) Moise, 73.
52. (Sl/8f) 2/Q/VHN/T134-64 050948Z August
1964.
53. (8//e!) 2/Gn/R03-64, 020822Z August 1964.
54. (D) Moise, 73.
55. (C) Ibid., 74.
56. (TS//SI) DIRNSA, 0209472 August 1964,
08004/02.
57.JD) Moise, 84.
58. (L')lhid., 86; (S//SI) 2/G11/VHN/RlO-64
040850Z August 1964.
59. (8//81) 2/Gll/yHN/R08-64~031925~.
60. (S//80 2/G11/VHN/R10-64, 040850ZAngust
1964. P.L. 86-36
61. (D)tlarolda,42L
62; (D) Moise, 88; Marolda, 415.
63. (D) McNamara, 140-141.
64. ffSt Marshall Wright, et al., "The Vietnam
Information Group. Presidential Decisions: The Gulf
of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964," Lyndon B. Johnson
Library, 1 November 1968, CCH Series \,rIII Box 13.
65. (TSl/SI) DlRNSA, "DRV Vessels Attack
Desoto Patrol in Gulf of Tonkin," B2:05/243-64
020947Z August 1964.
66. (T~//~I) DIRNSA, 021628Z, 3/01,--~-:-­
RI5-64. (D) Were the Chinese seriously interested in
intervening On 13 August 1964, Le Duan met with
Mao Zedong in Beijing to discuss the crisis. Mao was
not eager to fight and suggested to Le Duan that "....it
seems that the Americans do not want to fight a war,
you [DRV] do not want to fight a war, and we do not
necessarily want to fight a war." However, the PRC
did reinforce military units on its borders with the
DRV. In a meeting on 5 October between Pham Van
Dong, the prime minister of the DRV, Pham told
Mao that Hanoi wanted to avoid expanding the war
into the North.
(D) An interesting conversation occurred on the
13 August meeting between Mao and Le Duan. The
North Vietnamese confirmed the attack of 2 August
against the Maddox, but stated that it had occurred
because of decisions by the local navy commanders.
Mao told Le Duan that, according to intelligence
received by Beijing, the incident of 4 August was not
an attack by the Americans, but "caused by the
Americans' mistaken judgment, based on wrong
information." See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam
Wars, 1959-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2000), 131-133, and Odd Arne
Wested et alia, "77 Conversations Between Chinese
and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964),
177." Cold War International History Project Paper
No. 22 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson
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