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TOil 8EeftE1iteOMINfNX1
the Central Highlands, when Westmoreland,
after being briefed on that morning's fighting and
the prediction that more could come the next day,
finally warned his field commanders to the danger.
Only then were American units placed on
alert. Westmoreland also advised the South
Vietnamese military to recall their troops who
were on leave for Tet. The thirty-six-hour ceasefire
with the communists was then cancelled.P"
(U) It is this "premature" attack that we will
discuss next, for there is some indication from
SIGINT that it may have actually been planned all
along.
(U) The Mystery ofthe 30 January
"Premature" Attacks
~Onthe morning of 30 January (the 29th in
Washington), between 0100 and 0500 hours, a
number of communist units attacked points in
the provincial capitals in Pleiku, Quang Tri,
Darlac, and Khanh Hoa. Communist sapper
teams struck at the U.S. installations at Danang,
Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh Bay. The attacks of the
30th, which tipped Hanoi's hand to MACV and
thereby doomed the major assaults on 31
January, have been the subject of much speculation,
and several theories have been floated to
explain them. One suggestion is that the units
which attacked on the 30th in Pleiku Province
and on the coast at Nha Trang were confused
about the actual start of operations. Another theory
holds that the units involved acted independently,
perhaps reacting to a possible compromise
of operations.P''
CU) What appears to have happened is that
the original timetable for TCK/TCN was planned
to coincide with a Tet holiday truce proposed by
Hanoi that extended from 27 January to 3
February. This week-long period would allow the
communists a cushion in which all final preparations
for the assaults could be completed. At the
same time, this extended truce permitted NLF
cadre to organize demonstrations in Saigon itse
which would complement the military assault.l"
CU) However, General Westmorelaru
changed his mind on the length of the Tet truce
As early as 16 January, he and General Vien, th.
chief of staff of the South Vietnamese Army
approached President Thieu with the suggester
change. Although Thieu initially hesitated, he
agreed to the change. The communist intelligence
apparatus got wind of the shortened truce period
On 28 January, Westmoreland informed hi:
commanders that the truce would run only frorr
1800 hours on 29 January to 0600 hours on 31
January. This thirty-six-hour 'window forced the
communist command to radically change its own
timetable by moving up the start date even
though many units would not be fully prepared.
155
CU) Hanoi settled for a new attack date, which
appears to have been 31 January. But there is
some confusion over how this date was selected in
the first place. According to communist sources,
Hanoi had ordered another MR command, the
Tri Thien-Hue Military Region to begin the attack
on the Lunar New Year or 31 January. However,
South Vietnam was using a revised calendar in
which the new year began on 30 January.
According to these same sources, the Tri Thien­
Hue Military Region used the revised calendar
1~6
and set the attacks for 30 January." The problem
with this explanation is that the attacks on
30 January occurred solely in Military Region 5
and not in the Tri Thien-Hue Military Region,
which consisted of the provinces immediately to
the north.
OGA
(5//81) The evidenceJora change in the
Ii:IClli:r
attack date exists in/both SIGn~l and collateral
e s01lices·1
tiefing in the mIddle of February earned
t e III ormation that a document captured on 9
February indicated that the date of the initiation
of the offensive had been postponed shortly
I
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