spartans_in_darkness

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intentions by Hanoi. The report pointed out that
there was no tracking of the Craig earlier in
March. 12 6 This was not quite true: the DRV was
aware of the location of the destroyer, but its time
off the Vietnamese coast was quite short so the
tracking was spotty.
(6//61) The same report also pointed out that
the Maddox was under "constant" radar surveillance
before it came under attack on 2 August.
However, the report then ducks the issue of the
observed sporadic tracking by the North
Vietnamese on 4 August with the claim that "The
evidence is still inconclusive in light of the virtual
absence of trackings on 3-4 August before the second
attack." 127 The evidence would never be
found. The final report from the DSU aboard the
Maddox showed only occasional coastal tracking
from shore stations and North Vietnamese boats
on 4 August. And it had ended by mid-afternoon.
12 8
~ Finally, the Americans detected no Skin
Head emissions during the "attack" on 4 August.
Keep in mind that during 3 August the DRVboats
that shadowed the Desoto patrol used their Skin
Head surface search radars, and that these emissions
were detected by the ELINT position in the
intercept hut aboard the Maddox. These signals
were also intercepted during the morning and
early afternoon of 4 August. 12 9
(6//6I) While it is true that no North
Vietnamese radar emissions were detected during
the 2 August attack on the Maddox, it must be
remembered that this attack occurred in the daytime
under nearly ideal conditions.P" Yet, the
DRV boats had initial difficulty visually locating
and then following the Maddox. What we are
confronted with in the second "attack" is the
proposition that the North Vietnamese boats
themselves, which the Turner Joy and Maddox
detected using only their radars, could find the
Americans so far out at sea (over 100 nautical
miles), in heavy swells (three to six feet), at night,
with a low cloud cover, without using their
radars. Even if the North Vietnamese had the
equipment to receive the American radar pulses,
this information would have given them only a
crude bearing on which to track. They could not
determine distance, speed, or anything else with
1'H
which to plot any sort of torpedo attack.'
Besides that, how could they even begin to track
the American ships when the latest valid position
was almost five hours old!
(U) In the Sherlock Holmes story "Silver
Blaze," the great Victorian detective and his assistant,
Dr. Watson, are confronted with the paradox
of a crime which cannot be proven to have
happened. In the story there is this exchange:
Is there any point to which you wish to draw my
attention
To the curious incident of the dog in the nighttime.
The dog did nothing in the night-time.
That was the curious incident, remarked
Sherlock Holmes. 132
(6//6I) And so it is with the 4 August incident:
there were no DRV naval communications
or radar emissions which were normally associated
with a naval engagement..Just two days prior,
the Americans had an opportunity to observe
Vietnamese naval communications during the
attack on the Maddox. Among other things, they
had seen that the Vietnamese had difficulties in
setting up and maintaining control of an attack,
as the incident with the conflicting orders illustrated.
And so there should have been a generous
amount of intercept of any communications
which would have supported the claims of the two
American destroyers.
(6//6I) Yet, nothing as much as a single bark
was intercepted. As Holmes would come to conclude
that no crime was committed, so we must
conclude that, since U.S. SIGINT never intercepted
anything associated with an attack, none ever
occurred. And the contention that all possible
communications and emissions reflecting an
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