spartans_in_darkness

EO 1.4. (c)
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of intercept of North Vietnamesel
defense-related communications shifted to the
AFSS site at Danang. When the communist jet
fighters arrived at Phuc Yen in August, an operational
requirement to process their communications
was added to Danang's tasking,
(8//8!) Clearlv, staging theC-130 Queen Bee
missions I
Iwas not efficient in
terms of SIGINT processing. The best solution
was to relocate the Queen Bee missions to
Danang. This proved impossible at the moment.
CINCPAC ruled out any relocation because of the
already crowded conditions at the airfield: there
was lack of sufficient maintenance, hardstand
space, pilot and crew billeting facilities, etc. An
interim transfer procedure was put in place in
which the C-130 would land at Danang
(V) MiG-17 in V.S. gun sight
(S/lSI) SIGINT and the Air War,
1965-1968
(8//81) The effectiveness of SIGINT support
to air missions remained limited through mid­
1965. It would be the exigencies of the air defense
threat and the need to provide rapid and clear
threat and target information which would force
American SIGINT to provide the type of support
that U.S. airmen needed in their campaign over
North Vietnam.
(U) There are several misconceptions about
the air war fought in the skies over North
Vietnam. First of all, this was not a campaign of
air-to-air combat involving anything like the
numbers of aircraft such as the blitz over England
during World War II. Aerial combat in the
Indochina war was on a much smaller scale. Most
engagements were fought by handfuls of fighters.
Rarely did air combat directly involve more than
a dozen planes. On those occasions when it did, it
was a specifically designed operation such as
Operation Bolo.
(U) Another misconception is that of relative
effectiveness of the U.S. forces against those of
North Vietnam. While it is true that American aircraft
downed 193Vietnamese aircraft while losing
92, this ratio is misleading. The fortunes of the air
war in Southeast Asia can be best described as
"streaky." As both sides sought to gain (and
regain) an advantage, their relative effectiveness
against one another fluctuated. Both sides
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