spartans_in_darkness

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OGA
.........__"""":"'"
-------~____:,.....-~Ithat
Hue and Danang areas may be a[tac]k[e]d.
Enjtire] action against either or both might be
attempted as a diversionary measure to tie down
US andARVNtr[oo]ps in 1 CTZto preclude their
use if Khe Sanh is at[tac]k[e]d" (my italicsj.l'"
Finally, on 29 January, Westmoreland sent a
message to General Wheeler highlighting his
determination that planned communist attacks in
the rest of the country had been delayed, but that
these attacks, when launched, were intended to
"deter reinforcement of Northern I Corps" where
Khe Sanh was. 116
(D) Yet, for all of the American concern over
Khe Sanh, the Vietnamese never seriously tried to
capture the base. There were battalion-sized
assaults on 21 January against positions in the
hills northwest of the garrison, and three battalion
assaults on marine and ARVNpositions to the
south and west in February. On 7 February
(where the PAVN used tanks for the first time),
the Special Forces base at Lang Vei was taken.
These attacks resembled somewhat the
Vietnamese approach at Dien Bien Phu in which
separate parts of the outer defenses were taken to
further seal off the base. However, there were no
large-scale attacks to take the base itself. The
PAVN never massed artillery or antiaircraft guns
in order to overwhelm the base's defenses or deny
the use of aerial resupply as had been done
against the French fourteen years earlier. In fact,
during the second week of February, the PAVN
command shifted units away from Khe Sanh. So
what was Hanoi's intention
(D) The answer will probably never be known
for certain. Giap and other Vietnamese leaders
have vacillated from claiming that it was meant to
pin down American forces to an assertion that
This position coincides with communist man,
vering around the base. Bymid- February, whet
was apparent that the second phase had fai
completely, the North Vietnamese began to d
engage from around Khe Sanh. 119
Whatei
Hanoi's ultimate aim, the siege at Khe Sanh,
will be seen, distorted Washington's (a
MACV's) view of Hanoi's approaching milit.
offensive.
(U) Countdown to Tet: SIGINT
Reporting during January 1968
(8//8I) During the month of January, wh
attention in Washington and MACV in Saig.
was fixed on the marine garrison surrounded
two PAVN divisions, SIGINT picked up signs
communist military activity in other parts
South Vietnam. These indications came from
variety of communist communications interce]
ed throughout the country. The most importa
appeared to be in the Central Highlands, or t
B-3 Front. There two clusters of activity were
interest. The first was near the tri-border regie
of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam where t]
Headquarters B-3 front, the PAVN 1st Divisio
its Military Intelligence Section, and three ret
ments were concentrated. The second was at tl
Kontum-Pleiku border area. A separate hea
quarters element was active there and commur
cated with B-3 Front suggesting some coordina
ed actions.F" To the east of the highlands, the
were indications that the PAVN 2nd Division ar
associated elements were deploying to the coast
regions of Quang Ngai, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, at
other provinces. By 21 January, a forward heal
quarters element of another frontal cornman
which was communicating with three PAVN re,
iments, was located just ten kilometers fro
121
Hue.
they actually intended to take the base. ll7 Another ...----------------------.
theory has it that Hanoi had to determine if the
Americans would invade the DRVif the DMZ was
used to mount a multidivision assault.l'" Perhaps,
Khe Sanh was not meant to be taken until the second
phase of the TCKjTCN plan had succeeded.
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