spartans_in_darkness

lap SEeREli'leaMINlN*1
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sources of tactical intelligence, among them seismic,
acoustic, and infrared sensors, agent reports,
and the exotic XM-3 airborne personnel detector,
otherwise known as the "people sniffer." The
effect of all of these sources, including the
SIGINT, was to give the marines as current and
complete a picture as possible of communist
troop activity around Khe Sanh. 10 5
(8//8I) Still, the SIGINT from the radio battalion
detachment was of special significance,
especially to Colonel Lownds. During the siege,
Lownds would visit the detachment's bunker,
sometimes several times during the day, asking
for the latest intelligence. Lownds told the
marines there that if anything significant was
received they were to contact him at once, no
matter the time.l'"
(8//81) The marines at Khe Sanh also benefited
from a number of outside SIGINT resources
which provided additional collection, processing,
and DjF assets. The ASAsite at Phu Bai provided
overall management of the SIGINT assets
assigned to support Khe Sanh. It also processed
voice intercept from the team inside the base.
Phu Bai worked closely with the marine SIGINT
element at Danang which coordinated all SIGINT
support to the overall marine command in
the region, the III
MAF. Airborne collection
assets came from
the AFSS' Sentinel
Sara platform (EC-47)
which specialized in
intercept of low
power, tactical manual
morse communications
that even the
marines inside Khe
Sanh could not hear
due to the local hilly
terrain. ARDF support
came from the
Air Force Security
Service's Compass
CD) All of the SIGINT support reflected th.
great importance attached to Khe Sanh b:
General Westmoreland. When he had seen thr
buildup of communist forces in the region, the
question before his command was whether or no
to defend or abandon Khe Sanh. The weather ir
the region at that time of the year was rainy ane
prone to low-level clouds and fog which blanket
ed the area. Supporting the base would be
difficult; air supply would be the only way to keel
the garrison going. There were few mobile forcefree
to counter the PAVN divisions moving inte
the area. However, Westmoreland was confident
that the base could hold. He could mass ail
and artillery support from a variety of sourcee
which could compensate for the outnumberee
marines.lOS
CD) In Washington, though, there was a real
concern about Khe Sanh. On 11January, General
Earle G. Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, sent a message to Westmoreland
outlining the concerns in Washington. There
were two differing views on the battle. The first
was that Khe Sanh was an opportunity to use the
(V) Army P-2V airborne intercept and direction finding 'lircr'lft
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