spartans_in_darkness

"F9P SESRE"FHS9MIN"FN*1
relays of tracking reports of the Desoto patrol,
and those latter messages were exchanged with
T-142, which was involved in the ongoing recovery
operations. The only other messages which
were intercepted contained orders for other
Swatow-class patrol boats to move to positions
along the coast: T-130 and T-132 were ordered to
Hon Me Island, while T-165 was ordered to leave
Haiphong at 1448G (0748Z) and move to the
entrance of an unspecified bay.':"
Cg//81) During the 2 August attack, there
were elements of high-level control from the
naval commands at Port Wallut and Haiphong,
both of whom sent orders and tracking reports to
the attacking boats. The Swatows, principally T­
142, acted as a communications relay between the
torpedo boats and the onshore commands. The
messages were transmitted using high frequency
manual morse communications which were
intercepted throughout the day, even during the
fighting. Finally, there were sporadic boat-to-boat
VHF, tactical voice communications which the
intercept positions aboard the Maddox's hut
could intercept, at least until the destroyer activated
its fire control radars, which interfered with
the navy's monitoring.
(S//SI) However, not one of these elements
was detected during the night of 4 August. Trying
to find more evidence of the purported attack,
NSA had queried the NSG detachment aboard the
Maddox on 6 August to supply urgently all intercept
that "PROVIDES PROOF OF DRV ATTACK
ON FOUR AUGUST UPON U.S. NAVAL VES­
SELS." 122 Within five hours came the disheartening
reply from the DSU. There was no manual
morse intercept to prove the DRV attack of 4
August. Furthermore, voice intercept was nil,
except for signal checks between two unidentified
stations. 12 3
(S//S!) The tracking messages locating the
Desoto patrol ships had been intercepted by the
Americans early in the day of 4 August. However,
the last credible position of the American ships
was passed at 1610G (091OZ) from Haiphong to
T-142. The position, 19°36'N, 106°19'E, was fairly
close to the Desoto patrol's position at the time.
This was just about two hours before Herrick
ordered his ships to head east in reaction to the
Phu Bai Critic.f'" However, it should be pointed
out that this position report was sent to the T-142,
which was involved in the salvage of the 1\'\10 torpedo
boats. There is no evidence that the T-142
relayed it to any other boat or command.
(8//81) One more position report on the
Desoto patrol was sent from Port Wallut to a
probable vessel at 2246G (1546Z), which was
about an hour after the supposed engagement
had begun. This position report might seem as
related to the action, except for two problems.
First of all, the report located the American ships
thirty-five nautical miles east of Hon Matt Island,
which places the destroyers some eighty nautical
miles northwest of where they actually were at the
time! In addition, the report does not carry the
time associated with the Americans' position.
(The reported location suggests, however, at least
from the track the Desoto patrol took that night,
that this position report was about four to five
hours old.) So, this information could hardly be
used by any North Vietnamese boats intending to
attack the Americans. Secondly, the message
includes an order (or advisory) to the recipient to
maintain a continuous communications watch
with an unidentified entity, as well as to "go close
to shore." 125 This latter command seems to be
hardly intended for boats looking to attack the
American ships; rather it appears suited for the
boats involved in the salvage operations or the
other patrol boats spread out along the DRV
coast.
(S//SI) The issue of DRV tracking of the
Desoto patrol is important. For in September
1964 NSA would release a report on Vietnamese
coastal radar operations during the period. In this
report, NSA would contend that active tracking
by the coastal observation posts equipped with
coastal surveillance radars would indicate hostile
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