spartans_in_darkness

TOI! SEeKETlleSMltHh'X1
(V) VSS Turner Joy CDD-951) in 1964
PAC ordered both ships back to the patrol area,
seeing it "in our interest that we assert right of
freedom of the seas." CINCPACFLT issued new
rules of engagement for the next three days which
allowed both ships to approach the North
Vietnamese coast as close as eight nautical miles
and four miles from its islands. The two destroyers
were ordered to arrive at their daylight patrol
point about one hour before dawn, One hour
before sunset they were ordered to retire east out
to sea during the night.""
f&t Ifthe Pentagon brass was anxious to insert
its ships into harm's way, Captain Herrick was
more cautious. In an after-action report transmitted
that evening, which reviewed the attack and
the successful American defense, he added a
warning: the "DRV HAS C[AS]T DOWN THE
GAUNTLET AND NO[W] CONSIDERS ITSELF
AT WAR WITH US." He added a concern that the
DRV's torpedo boats, especially at night, could
hide and then approach the destroyers with little
warning.i" He stated that the Maddox and the
Turner Joy, with their five-inch guns and top
speed of thirty-three knots, were inadequately
armed for defense against such boats. He suggested
that the Desoto patrol would be safe only
with a cruiser and continuous air cover. One last
item was reported by Captain Herrick: the
Maddox's long-range, air search radar (ANjSPS-
40) was inoperative,
and the fire control
radar CANjSPG-53)
belonging to the USS
Turner Joy, which had
just arrived to reinforce
him, was out of action
indefinitely.P"
CU) At the close of
2 August, the North
Vietnamese boats were
hiding in coastal waters
caring for their casualties
and waiting for
orders as to what to do
next. The Maddox was joined by the Turner Joy
out at sea, and both were being replenished with
ammunition and supplies while under way. They
had been ordered to return to the coast at daybreak.
(S//SI) The SIGINT community could be
proud of its efforts during the day. The field sites
and NSA had intercepted, processed, and reported
North Vietnamese naval communications in
such a rapid and clear way that everyone in the
Pacific command was aware of the approaching
attack. It also had provided the information to
Washington that suggested that Hanoi's grip on
events was less certain than was expected. At the
same time, by monitoring the DRV's naval communications,
the cryptologists had developed a
picture of the command and control elements
prior to an attack: extensive tracking by coastal
observation posts; the identification of a target
and the communication of an attack command;
and the use, if limited, of radars in locating the
target. The Maddox had never been explicitly
named as the target of the attack; in fact, there
was just the notation of an "enemy"; however, the
analysts at Phu Bai, San Miguel, and inside the
Desoto hut had correlated the North Vietnamese
tracking with the American ship. The Maddox
had been fixed in the minds of the American cryptologists
as an "enemy vessel" to the North
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