spartans_in_darkness

"FOP SECRE"Fh'COMltHiI)E1
OGA
start on 29 January or "shortly thereafter." The
most concrete example was carried in Follow-up
5 (and repeated in Follow-up 7), which reported
on January 28 that an element of the PAVN 1st
Division in western Pleiku Province had informed
another unidentified subordinate unit that the
attack was to begin "as soon as possible but no
later than 0030 hours (Golf) on 30 January." 138
(S//SO Another important aspect of this
reporting concerning "N-Day," but never highlighted
in any reports, that all but one reference
to it occur only in the communications of the
communist B-3 Front. The B-3 Front was responsible
for military operations in Pleiku and
Kontum Provinces within the communist
Military Region 5, which extended from Quang
Nam Province south to Darlac Province.
Furthermore, these communications are all from
regular PAVN formations in Military Region 5:
the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Divisions, and the GDRS element.
The only unit outside the B-3 Front, but
still within MR 5, that referred to "N-Day" was
located very tentatively near Danang.P" And
recall that Danang was attacked on 30 January.
(S//SO It should be pointed out that the general
Tet attacks began on the morning of 31
January (Saigon). Therefore, in these reports
what NSA really is reporting is the starting time
for the so-called "premature" attacks of 30
January (29th in Washington). These attacks
have been subjected to much discussion as to
whether or not they were planned or the product
of a misunderstanding by the units in the Central
Highlands and Coastal regions of MR 5. This
question will be covered in the next section.
Suffice it to say that the "N-Day'' reference in the
communist messages may have referred to something
else than the start of Tet, and the multitude
of possible dates could only impair the utility of
this piece of intelligence. There is a suggestion of
this confusion when, on 25 January, General
Westmoreland cabled General Wheeler that the
25th was "shaping up as a D-Day for widespread
pre-Tet offensive action" by the communist
forces.I''" Note that 25 January was mentioned i
the NSA series as a possible "N-Day."
(S//SO This last point leads into the secon
question of whether the NSA report series, an
the other SIGINT reporting, made any sort c
impact on the command centers in ••.. Saigon an,
Washington. Ithas to be stated up front that ther
is little evidence that the SIGINT reporting mad
an impact, or influenced either command abou
the nature of the Tet offensive or its timing. Th
first mention in the President's Daily.Brief of ;
possible general offensive was on 20 Januar
prior to the NSA series. The next reference doe.
not appear in the brief until 29 January when;
small item is included about cornmunist'forces ir
the western Central Highlands completing thei
battle preparations.l'"
(D) However, the White House's Curren
Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) carried far more infor
mation on the communist buildup. The CIB wa:
distributed to a much wider audience than th:
Presidential Brief. On both 27 and 28 January
the CIB carried items from NSA's 25 January
report. However, in the same 28 January
Bulletin, it was stated that the communists
intended to launch large-scale attacks on one 01
more fronts soon after the Tet holiday, and that it
was not certain if an all-out offensive was in.the
works. 14 2
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