spartans_in_darkness

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EO 14. (c )
~ By the end of the 1966-1967 dry season
campaign in May, the strategic situation in
Vietnam could have been called a stalemate.
Although the communist efforts to strengthen
their position south of the DMZ had failed, efforts
by MACV to drive them out of their strongholds
north of Saigon and along the Laos and Cambodia
border regions similarly had failed. The American
presence had climbed to 450,000 troops, while
Hanoi's infiltration had kept pace. The United
States was spending $2 billion per month'!
(U) General Thanh returned toHarioiund
presented his plans to break the stalemate and
force the United States out of the war. His argument
was simple: the only way that Hanoi could
force Washington out of the war was to convince
it that the costs of continuing the struggle would
----IIThe month before, far outweigh anything that it could realize
General Westmoreland had told President by remaining committed to Saigon's support.i'"
Johnson that, unless the communist structure fell If Johnson wanted to escalate the war, it would
apart, the war could go on for five more years. 3 2 seriously threaten America's global strategic position
and seriously undermine his domestic social
The "limited war" Washington had bargained for
may have seemed unending. But for Hanoi, the and economic programs.i" Hanoi wanted
time seemed right for a roll of the die.
to exploit the "internal contradiction" of
Washington's position.
(U) Hanoi and Washington Plan
for Victory
(U) Hanoi's problem was how to exploit this
contradiction in Washington's stance. The solution,
according to Thanh and other planners, was
(U) To the communist leaders in Hanoi, the
military-political situation in South Vietnam was to hit the Americans where they were weakest ­
not as encouraging as it could have been. The
previous campaign, that is, the 1966-67 Winter­
Spring Campaign (October 1966 to May 1967),
had produced nothing more than a continuation
of the previous military standoff. However, even
in the midst of the campaign season, changes
were being contemplated. In January 1967, the
13th Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party
had called for the adoption of a new strategy combining
political/diplomatic and military methods.
Ho Chi Minh praised this new approach, termed
"fighting while negotiating," and appealed for
party unity so as to implement it. 33
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the South Vietnamese political and military structure.
The communists would strike at the ARVN
and Saigon's governmental apparatus in a countrywide
assault. At the same time, an appeal
would be made by the NLF to the nationalist sentiment
of the South Vietnamese population to rise
up against the regime in Saigon and thereby isolate
the Americans. Bereft of popular support, the
United States would have no choice but to exit
Vietnam. The DRV knew it could not defeat the
United States in a direct military confrontation;
the terms for beating the U.S. could be found in
destroying the weakest element of its policy ­
South Vietnam's government and its forces. In a
way, this thinking reflected the Vietnamese historical
fascination with the success of its ruralurban
revolution of 1945 when handfuls of Viet
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