spartans_in_darkness

TOP SEeRETNeOMIPHN*1
.L. 86-36
resources away from current Vietnamese
COMINT operations.i"
(S//SI) Despite the mln y pror~:rns with t.h ....e'.
ADP development plans, refused to be ..
deferred in his quest for a computer capability.In
May 1974, he met ,,,,ith the new NSArepreseD.ta::
tive in Saigon~ ~arid p~~p6sed a
six-month test of the concept. aveteranof
the Indochina SIGINT effort romasfar backas
1962, and having served in Saigon and in/Fort
Meade, forcefully tried to convirtc~
~hatthe
test would not prove anything; usmg computers
for SIGINT required specialized training-and a
t.. h.e ..··...
DGTS current abilities. However / ersisted
and suggested that he send to tHe m ed Sta es
techni::al compe~.e.....n.:,c.t,\Vhich wr e ob....rd ...
the head of his cryptanalytic division
.c=:=Jto study computers. D;::ru":":'s~r:::'a~.·~e~~yr-l
~~~~:;t:~n~~:t~~~~t::~lra/~t(aba
some small assistance and "keep him out ot trouble
as much as possible." 3.9
(5//£1)1 rnallydidgo to theUnited
States to study computers and programming.
When he returned, he developed a plan for ADP
usage in the DGTS. In the middle of March 1975,
as the PAVN divisions were grinding down. the
ARVN units in the Central Highlands and.with
barely six weeks/left in the life ofthe DGTS and
South Vietnam,lIscheduled a briefi. /ng for
I Fn the-rrevJ plan. At the heart of the
dISCUSSIOn were the same issues as befo..re.1I
congratulated~ ~or a good c~
but reminde them or the problem of the
uncleared CLC personnel.t"
(T~//~I) Between the Paris Peace Agreement
and the collapse of the Saigon regime, the DGTS
never achieved the level of competence that NSA
had hoped for back in the beginning of the VIMP.
A survey of evaluations from those three years
illustrates the difficulties in /just getting the
Vietnamese to do tber job, fueh less develop a
strategic capability as wanted to assume.
For example, in January 1973 the NRV reported
to Fort Meade on his meeting withl
He described that, when asked to evaluate the
competency of his organization,lIieclared
that the directorate was good at t~xploitatiori/but
minimally good at strategic communications,
namely mainline military communications
from Hanoi's military headquarters to COSVN,
fronts, divisions, and the separate internal North
Vietnamese military ground, air, naval, and civil
networks. The NSA representative added that
r---1ould not admit that the latter capability
~vas nothing more than a "zero.,. 41
(T5//5I) Durilg the lame evaluation of his
own organization, also admitted that the
Vietnamese cryptologists would need continuous
training and support. As was seen earlier, the
original plan for developing the Vietnamese signals
intelligence organization had been predicated
on an indefinite U.S. cryptologic presence in
South Vietnam. Because of the unexpected (and
accelerated) drawdown of U.S. forces, and the
complete assumption of the fighting by the ARVN
combat units, American advice and training had
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