spartans_in_darkness

"FOP SEORETOeOMIN"Fh'*1
18. (8//81) 2/0jVHK-E/Rl-65, 0823122 January
1965.
19. (U) Figures vary with the determination of the
range of Hanoi's air surveillance system beyond its
borders. Some estimates put it as far as 230 miles. The
detection range estimates depend on a number of factors,
which, if individually varied, could affect the
range. These factors included the aircraft's altitude,
size, and radar cross section; the location and height
(to sea level) of the early warning radar, the weather,
time of day, and whether or not ECM were employed.
The 150-mile detection range is based on the radar
return of an F-105 flying at 15,000, the normal ingress
altitude by American strike aircraft.
20. (S//SI) Thompsonl landuGerhard,u50.
21. (S//SI) Pike, 116; For example, also see "North
Vietnam Monthly Air Summary," 2/H8/VHA/ROl-62,
31 October 1962, and 2/H8jVHT/R02-62, 0507452
October 1962.
22. (TS//SI) Thomas Thompson, Special
Historical Study: DevelopmentofUSAFSS Capability
in Southeast Asia. Vol II: The Buildup, a Period of
Experimentation, 1962 (San Antonio, TX: HQ USAF­
SS, 1963),4-5.
23. ('f8//81) Thomas Thompson, Special
Historical Studu: Development ofUSAFSS Capability
in Southeast Asia. Vol III: 1963 - A Year ofDifficulty
(San Antonio, TX: HQ USAFSS, 1963), xviii.
24. (S//SI) 2/0jVCK-E/Rl-70, 0221402 January
1970.
26. (TS//SI) Thomas N. Thompson, A Special
Historical Study ofSIGINTSupport to Air Operations
in SEA 1965-1972 (San Antonio, TX: HQ, United
States Air Force Security Service. No. 10, 1972), 9.
27. (T8//81) ThompsonDand Gerhart, 56.
28. (TS//SI) Ibid., 68.
29. (TS//SI) Ibid., 77.
30. (rS//SI) Ibid., 85.
31. (U) Robert Frank Futrell, Aces and Aerial
Victories: The United States Air Force in Southeast
Asia 1965-1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force
History, Headquarters, USAF, 1976), 12-16.
32. (U) Marshall L. Michel III, Clashes: Air
Combat over North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 139-140; Futrell, 16.
33. (TS//SI) Thompson, SIGINT Support to Air
Operations in Southeast Asia, 1965-1972, 21.
34. (TS//SI) Ibid., 32-33.
35. (TS//81) Ibid., 35.
36. (TS//SI) Ibid., 36.
37. (TS//SI) Thompson, 29; Gibson 358-360.
TF77 reported to CINCPAC while 7th AF reported to
MACV for instructions.
38. Schulzinger, 203.
39. (U) Ibid., 207, 210; The most important
assessment may have been the 1966 study by the
Institute of Defeflse Analysis, krio""iias the JasoD. P . L . 86- 36
Study. See Gibson, pps 346-349; also Harold Ford for
a post-Tet CIA estimate of the results of continuing the
bombing, pps 127-8.
40. (S//SI) "SIGINT Informationon CHICOM
Forces in North Vietnam, 1969,"NCA# 45222;
Schulzinger 210; Van De Mark, 108.
41. (8//81) NRV to PACSCY'rRGN, F4/1435, 21
July 1965.
42. (TS//SI) James E. Pierson, A Historical Study
of the Iron Horse System (San Antonio, TX: United
State Air Force Security Service 15 December 1974),
10.
43. (TS//SI) Ibid., 11.
44. (1'9//81) Ibid., 15-16.
4,5. (TS//SI) Ibid., 17.
46. (TS//SI) Ibid., 17-18.
47. (TS//SI) Johnson, American Cryptology duringtheCaldWar,Vol.11,54f1,.
48. (TS//SI) Ibid.; Pierson, 22. EO 1. 4. (c)
49. (TS//SI) Pierson, 18.
50. (TS//SI) Ibid., 22.
51. (TS//81) Ibid., 25.
52. (TS//SI) Ibid.
53. (TS//SI) Thompson, SIGINT Support to Air
Operations in Southeast Asia, 1965-1972, 42.
54.-,U//SB Thompson, 42; Futrell, 37.
55. (TS//SI) Thompson, 46-47.
56. (TS//SI) Ibid., 52.
57. (U) Futrell, 11;Micel, 74.
58. (U) Futrell, 11.
59. (U) Michel, 101.
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