spartans_in_darkness

=rell SEe~E=rh'eeMItHt'lX1
Americans. These products were available at the
time of the composition of the chronology. Yet
why they were not included is unknown.
Obviously, their absence leaves the reader with
the impression of Hanoi's overt aggression
against the American ships.
(~//~I) The way the material is presented is
also curious. Almost all of the SIGINT product
included for both 2 and 4 August has attached the
reproduction of the original intercept of the DRV
navy's messages: that is, the cipher and its
decrypted Vietnamese text. This allows the reader
to see the unfolding of the SIGINT process,
from intercept to report.
(S//8I) However, there is one glaring exception
to this: the 4 August translation of the socalled
"after-action" report used by Secretary
McNamara and President Johnson as primary
evidence of the attack. In fact, only the translation
is included, and it is there only as "a sample."
Considering the importance attached to it by the
administration, as we saw earlier, this is a very
odd way of presenting this piece of critical
evidence. It would seem that the NSA originators
of the chronology would have added the complete
cipher and Vietnamese text to bolster the case
for an attack. Yet the translation stands alone.
Since we know that the intercept used to produce
the translation currently is missing, might we
ask if they were already "missing" shortly after
the incident itself and the composition of the
chronology
(S//S1) Finally, the chronology does not
address the problem of the total lack of
North Vietnamese C3I related to the supposed
4 August attack. Not surprisingly, there are samples
of the C3I from the 2 August attack. Yet,
aside from the so-called "attack" message and the
purported "after-action" report, there is nothing
for 4 August. We have commented on this before.
The argument that the material may not have
been available in early August might have had
some slight relevance. The chronology might
have been the vehicle for addressing this shortcoming.
However, fully two months later, there is
still nothing included of the enemy's C3I - the
huge gap is not addressed, much less explained,
by NSA.
(Sl/Sf) Over the years, the chronology came
to be the source book for responses to congressional
inquiries into the Gulf of Tonkin incidents.
That is, the other 90 percent of related SIGINT
product was not offered to any congressional
investigating committees. Instead, the chronology
became, by virtue of its position as an "official"
report, the only source for background on the
Gulf of Tonkin incidents.
(T~//~I) The first investigation came in early
1968 when the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator
William Fulbright, who had steered the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution through the Senate, opened
hearings on the incident. Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara was called in to testify. Prior
to his testimony, he requested that the pertinent
COMINT on the incidents be given to him. The
NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency were
reluctant to have the SIGINT used; both agencies
were fearful that the exposure would compromise
the then current capabilities against the North
Vietnamese.V" Ultimately, Secretary McNamara
was given the contents of the chronology, as was
the Senate committee as well. The resulting hearings
did nothing to clear up the confusion.
McNamara argued for the attack, citing the various
SIGINT reports, though he seemed to mix up
what was in them, and left observers sometimes
confused.F" Many senators, looking at the same
chronology, remained skeptical.
(Sl/Sf) In August 1975, the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, under the chairmanship
of Senator Frank Church of Idaho,
approached NSA about the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
The committee's interest, though, may not
have been in establishing the validity of the incident;
their attention was focused on information
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