spartans_in_darkness

Tap SEe~E'FHeaMllffJf~1
ators, and the absence of visual sightings.'"
McNamara called Sharp, who added that there
was "a little doubt on just what exactly went
on. ,,101 Messages buzzed back and forth between
Washington and the Pacific, demanding information
and then getting contradictory evidence of
the attack. The Desoto mission reported that
except for possibly the first torpedo report at
2159G (14592), all others were caused by reflections
off the two destroyers' screws.l'" At the
same time, Herrick reported that the air cover
from the two carriers was unable to locate the targets
because of poor weather. Yet the carrier
Ticonderoga transmitted its own evaluation in
which the pilots had "REPORT[ED] NO \;1SUAL
SIGHTINGS OF ANY VESSELS OR WAKES
OTHER THAN TURNER JOY AND M[ADDOX].
WAKES FROM TURNER JOY AND M[ADDOX]
VISIBLE FROM 2-3000 YARDS." 103 Crews from
the two destroyers reported seeing nothing for
certain. One sailor thought he had seen flashes of
gunfire, but wasn't sure.
(U) At 1640 EDT, Admiral Sharp again called
McNamara with more information on the attack.
Just before 1700 EDT, McNamara and the JCS
met to evaluate the evidence on the attack. They
concluded that it had occurred and that five factors
were critical: "(1) The Turner Joy was illuminated
[by a searchlight] when fired on by automatic
weapons; (2) One of the destroyers
observed cockpit [bridge] lights [of one of the
DRVpatrol boats]; (3) A PGM 142 had shot at two
L.S. aircraft (from COMINT); (4) A North
Vietnamese announcement that two of its boats
were 'sacrificed' (from COMINT); (5) Admiral
Sharp's determination that there was indeed an
attack." 105
(U) Of the five pieces of "evidence," two were
from the same NSA product issued that afternoon.
If the two pieces of visual evidence - the
searchlight and cockpit light reports - were contentious,
the SIGINT was, in the minds of the secretary
of defense, the ,JCS, and the president, the
"smoking gun" evidence needed to justify the air
strikes on North Vietnam.'" So, at 0700G
(00002) on 5 August, CINCPAC received the
(TS//SI) Then, like a classic deus ex machina,
along came a second SIGINT report that seemed
to clinch the case for an attack. This report was a
translation issued by NSA on the 4th of August at
19332 (1533 EDT in Washington) and was leaped
upon by administration officials, especially
Robert McNamara, as direct evidence of the
attack. What this translation appeared to be was
a sort of North Vietnamese after-action report.
An unidentified North Vietnamese naval authority
had been intercepted reporting that the DRV
had "SHOT DOvVN TWO PLWES IN THE BAT­
TLE AREA," and that "WE HAD SACRIFICED
TWO SHIPS "WD ALL THE REST ARE OKAY."
It also added that "THE ENEMY SHIP COULD
ALSO HAVE BEEN DAMAGED." 104
(V) Burning North Vietnamesepatrol boat
qfter 5 August strike
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