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concerning the covert OPLAN 34A and Desoto
missions, and what exactly was being done by
both operations. NSA's response to the Church
Committee's request was similar to that of
Fulbright's: limited release of materials from the
chronology. In fact, NSA was concerned that the
Church Committee get exactly what Fulbright
had received. 18 5 Again, the chronology of the
events of 2 to 4 August was the source used for
material to be released. Interestingly, a major figure
in these latter deliberations on what to release
to the Senate was the then-retired, former deputy
director of NSA, Dr. Louis Tordella. He had
advised the NSA staff as to what to release and
hold back. Curiously, one of the few things held
back was a similar chronology of the events of
mid-September 1964, in which another Desoto
patrol claimed it had been attacked.
O~I/~I) GulfofTonkin Redox:
The 18 September "Attack"
(8//£1) In an interesting and ironic repeat of
the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, on 18 September
1964 another Desoto patrol would undergo the
same experience as the Maddox and Turner Joy.
In this incident, two destroyers, the DSS Morton
(DD 948) and the DSS Richard S. Edwards (DD
950), were assigned a Desoto mission for mid­
September. The ships began their operations on
16 September. The North Vietnamese knew
almost from the start that the two vessels would
be in the area and were tracking it. The DRV
naval authorities also ordered their ships and
posts to be on alert and to be aware for "provocations
. "by thee Ameri encans. 186
(~//SI) North Vietnamese tracking of the two
destroyers held through the 17th and into the 18th
of September. At 1738G (1038Z) on 18
September, a message was passed from an
unidentified DRV naval authority that ordered all
ships to take precautions against possible South
Vietnamese maritime commandos who might
take advantage of the presence of the American
ships in the area and launch an attack. The North
Vietnamese ships were also ordered to "avoid
provocation" and to disperse and camouflage. 187
(D) At about 1729G (1029Z), the two destroyers
acquired radar contacts following them. Both
ships began to maneuver and increase speed to
clear the apparent vessels trailing them. About
forty-five minutes later, the Morton fired a warning
shot at one of the contacts. By this time, the
Americans counted on their radar scopes five
ships trailing them. However, the warning shot
did not deter the threatening vessels. About ten
minutes later, both ships opened fire. For about
the next hour, both American ships engaged the
contacts as they appeared on their radar screens.
Oddly, at no time did the contacts return any fire,
nor did they launch any torpedoes. Even more
curious, only one of the enemy ships ever closed
faster than twenty-three knots. In fact, the contacts
pretty much matched the speeds of the
destroyers. Meanwhile, the Morton and Edwards
fired almost 300 rounds at the contacts and
claimed to sink as many as five of the vessels
(there were now more than the original five contacts)
which had been menacing them.
~ The JCS ordered a search, to begin the
next morning, of the area for debris to confirm
the attacks. At the same time, plans were put
under way for another retaliatory strike against
the DRV. More air force and navy aircraft were
dispatched to the region to reinforce the proposed
strikes. l s 8 Yet, nothing happened. The area was
searched, but no debris nor even an oil slick was
found. The JCS continued to request data on the
attacks from all the intelligence and combat commands.
Yet even by the 19th there still was no
concrete evidence of an attack.l""
(TS//8I) Available SIGINT information indicated
that the North Vietnamese were well aware
of the presence of the two destroyers, but
remained in a defensive posture. The DRV was
looking to react to a possible maritime raid by the
South Vietnamese, but there were no reflections
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