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1967 the Korean MiGs mixed with the Americans.
Again, the results were not good. On 19 and 21
July, four Korean MiGs were shot down without
any American losses. This led to a stand-down of
the Korean contingent.
(S//SI) After the stand-down, the Korean
pilots flew, but with their most experienced pilots
doubling as ground controllers.i" ByAugust, they
returned to Kep, where on 23 August they scored
their first air victory when four MiG-17s attacked
a USAF combat air patrol and shot down an F-4C.
At about the same time, the North Koreans began
flying MiG-2ls from Phuc Yen. These pilots
would remain at Phuc Yen and be integrated into
North Vietnamese MiG-2l operationsr' on occasion,
however, the Korean MiG-2ls would fly
joint operations with their MiG-17 counterparts,
usually under the control of a single Korean controller.
88
(S//SI) From September 1967 to March 1968,
the Koreans continued to fly patrols out of Kep. In
the first months of 1968, the Korean pilots had
sporadic engagements with American aircraft. In
three separate encounters, the Koreans downed a
USAF F-105 and an F-4D, while losing a MiG-21.
(S//SI) After the bombing pause, the Koreans
consolidated their aircraft at Kep airfield. There
was little left for them to do. The Koreans busied
themselves with reconnaissance patrols and tactical
training. One activity they engaged in frequently
was reaction to American pilotless reconnaissance
drones. On 16 May 1968, during one of
these reactions, a flight of two MiG-2ls was pursuing
a drone when the flight leader, lacking a
clear shot, launched a missile and downed his
wingman.f"
(S//SI) By early 1969, flight activity fell to
virtually nothing as the Koreans prepared to leave
North Vietnam, which they did finally on
9 February.
(U) "Take nothing on faith":
SIGINT and the Son Tay Raid,
21 November 1970
CU) On the evening of 21 November 1970,
American prisoners of war CPOW) held at the
prison at Dan Hoi, just ten miles west of downtown
Hanoi, were awakened by the sounds of
gunfire and explosions some ten miles further to
the west of them in the neighborhood of the town
of Son Tay. Flares burned in the sky, creating an
eerie light show, while the faint staccato beat of
automatic weapons fire mixed with the shriek and
roar of U.S. combat aircraft flying overhead. It
would be some months later when the prisoners
would learn that this had been the unsuccessful
raid on the prison complex at Son Tay by U.S.
Special Forces. U.S. Navy Lieutenant Everett
Alvarez, the longest-held POW, would ruefully
note the irony of the U.S. captives at Dan Hoi
watching a raid under way that had been meant to
free them,"
CU) Over the years, the raid on Son Tay has
accrued enough controversy of its own to fill several
books. The raid has become a symbol for
many positions concerning the Indochina War.
Some critics see it as an example of the congenitally
flawed U.S. planning, while others view the
raid as a brilliantly conducted special military
operation, or "SPECOP." Others look at it as a
gesture to the captive U.S. prisoners that the
United States had not forgotten them. It is not
difficult to be impressed with the planning and
precision of the conduct of the raid. Yet, one has
to wonder why, during the seven months of planning
and training by the rescue group prior to the
raid, nobody involved in the planning tried to verify
whether or not the POWs were still in the
pnson.
CU) The genesis of the raid was information in
late 1969 concerning widespread mistreatment of
U.S. prisoners by the North Vietnamese at a number
of prison camps in the DRV. Actually, this
intelligence was already dated. By mid-1969,
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