spartans_in_darkness

EO 1.4. (c)
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108. (~//~O DSN-414T, 041115ZAugust 1964.
109. (~//~O DSM-626J, 0411402 August 1964.
110. (S//Sl) 2/Gll/VHN/R13-64, 041440Z August
1964. It is possible that this intercept was the missing
part of the message sent earlier and construed as the
"attack" order.
111. (S//SI) 2/Q/yHN/T163-64, 090328Z August
1964.
112. (~//~O 2/Gll/VHN/R17-64, 041820ZAugust
1964.
113. (SHSI) 2/Q/VHN/R42-64, 041900Z August
1964.
114.fStCTD 77.12 Z 041240ZAugust 1964.
115. (SHSI) 2/Q/VHN/T128-64 041838Z August
1964.
116. (S//SI) Ibid.
117. (TS//SI) 3/0/yHN/ROl-64, 5 August 1964.
118. CD) Marelda, 408; bomb damage assessments
from 5 August indicate that some P-4s may have been
at Quang Khe. However, there is no SIGINT reflection
to support any activity during this period by P-4s in
the Southern Naval Command.
119. (~//SI) 2/G11/VHN/R16-64, 04i746ZAugust
1964.
120. tst JCS Z ° 041628Z August 1964, CCH
Series vl.HH.24.1O.
121. ES//SI) 2/Gll/VHN/R15-64, 041745Z August
1964.
122. (S//SI) DIRNSA, 070118Z August 1964.
123. (S//SI) DS-467N, 070615Z, August 1964.
124. (S//Sl) 2/Q/VHN/T151-64, 080324Z August
1964. ~CA ACC# 45359Z.
125. (S;,/~I) 2/Q/VHN/T152-64, 080440Z August
1964, NCA ACC# 45359Z.
126. (S//8I) 2/0/VHN/R11-64, Spot Report 3
September 1964.
127. (el/SI) Ibid.
128. ES//8I) OlC, DSN-467N.
129. ES//SI) Ibid.
130. ETSl/S!) COMNAVFORJAPAN, "Preliminary
All Source Evaluation Maddox Patrol," 120230Z
October 1964.
131. CD) Moise, 163-164.
132. (D) Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Complete
Sherlock Holmes (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
& Company, 1930),347.
133. (D) Moise, 201.
134. (D) OlC DSN-.467N.
135. (9//90 2/Q/VHN/T126-64, 030450Z August
1964; attached worksheet 1609-64, DSN-414T. NCA
ACC# 45359Z, DSN-27 1964 translations. Also, see
2/Gll/VHN/R06-64, 0221272 August 1964.
136. (~//~I) 2/Q/VHN/R39-64, 041646Z August
1964. This serialized report was sent at a precedence
("ZZ") reserved for Critics. This was a technical error
and did not affect warning or timeliness. However, it
makes tracking down the reportsmore difficult.
137. CD) Moise, 200.
138. (SHSI) B26 COMINT Technical Report
#009-65,1 129 March 1965,
CCH SerieL-s":'X;';'I;""I.NN=:-.
...J
139. CD) Moise, 200; Lyndon B. Johnson, 114.
('f~//9I) In the matter of who the "experts" were that
President Johnson is referring to, it appears that they
were members of the White House Intelligence
Advisory Staff. According to one source, they examined
"all available intelligence having even the most
remote relevance [to the Gulf of Tonkin]." According
to this source, SIGINT alone provided "positive evidence
of DRV premeditation." Whether this evidence
refers to the 2 or 4 August incidents is unclear. It is
also not certain if all "relevant intelligence" was pursued.
Furthermore, it is not clear if any of the "experts"
were Vietnamese linguists, or if they were being
prompted by the analysts at NSA. Source: NSA
Memorandum for the Record: "Interview with Mr.
Arthur McCafferty, White House Staff, on the use of
SIGINT in Shaping White House Decisions on
Southeast Asia," CCH Series XII.NN., undated.
140. (S//Sl) 2/Q/VHN/R39-64.
141. (S//S1) For identity of LAP, see 2/Q/VHN/
T123-64; for TRi\ see 2/Q/VHN/T134, 135-64.
Callwords/covernarnes were used to designate units,
entities, and individuals. It was not uncommon to see
a particular entity, such as T-142, addressed with as
many as three callwords over this period. However,
these callwords equated to any number of differing
entities that would have been aboard.
142. (Sl/S!) The missing intercept would have
arrived in the form of so-called technical supplements
to the San Miguel reports "38" and "39." Generally
these supplements were sent anywhere from fifteen to
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