spartans_in_darkness

P.L.
86-36
·EO
1.4. (d)
Tap SECRETJlCaMINlJlX1
nist units, especially the 10th
Division." These teams would be
supported bv thePleiku Technical
centerJ/ Ian~ I
o ew to Plelku on 7 March to
inspect the center. The center's
poor performance, especially its
intercept mission, which met only
twenty percent of its objectives, was
a real concern to the leadership in
Saigon. 73
(S//SI) Like earlier at Phuc
Long, the communist units began to
attack outposts near cities all
around South Vietnam to further
divert attention from the main
effort. With the number of attacks
being reported from all over the
country, Saigon was uncertain
where the main thrust was to occur.
That question was answered on 10
March when five PAVN infantry
regiments, supported by tanks and
assault engineer teams, attacked
Ban Me Thuot from three directions.
After heavy fighting, the city
fell on 11 March. Along with the
division's deputy commander, the
communists seized its communications
center, complete with radios,
switchboard, cipher equipment and
cryptokeys.' Desperate to recover
the city, General Phu mounted a
counterattack with the remaining regiments of
the 23rd Division. Flown in by helicopter, these
regiments were hit by the PAVN 10th Division
which, along with the 316th, had been awaiting
them. The two communist units then proceeded
to push the remnants of the ARVN forces eastward.
(S//SI) The attack at Ban Me Thuot was a
complete success for the communists. Their
deception plan had confused the South
Vietnamese command as to the real objective; it
(V) C'lmp'lign in the Central Htqhlands, Milit'lty Region 2,
8 M'lrch-2 April 1975
reflected the difficult nature of interpreting the
confusing intelligence on hand regarding communist
intentions. Ralliers and captured documents
had seemed to indicate that Ban Me Thuot
was the objective. On the other hand, the relative
lack of COMINT, except for the intercept of the
968th's messages, had suggested that Pleiku was
the target. Another aspect to the success of the
communists was their ability to monitor the
ARVN communications. PAVN COMINT units
listened in on the ARVNas the latter searched for
the communist units surrounding Ban Me Thuot.
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