spartans_in_darkness

"FOP SE6RETNSOMIPH,'f*4
intercept of the Vietnamese transmission, then
the half-hour difference suggests that the "attack"
message was sent more than once. Why more
than once It is possible that Port Wallut had not
received the first transmission from T-142,
although the reports from both Marine sites
imply that the message was received each time.
Secondly, the lag between the file time and the
actual transmission time by the Vietnamese, if
figured from the American time of intercept, suggests
that the Vietnamese were having difficulties
in transmitting messages in a timely manner.
This delay, as we shall see, becomes an important
element in determining the DRV intentions.
(D) At about this time, the three torpedo boats
had arrived at Hon Me Island. The Maddox,
which was steaming on a northeast heading away
from the island, had observed visually the arrival
of the three boats. Shortly afterwards, the two
Swatows were seen by the Maddox in the area of
Hon Me. The five North Vietnamese boats now
were concentrated at the island.
(8//81) The "attack" message was followed up
by another message, this time from Port Wallut to
T-146, which was intercepted at 1306G (0612Z)
by the Marines in the Philippines. The message
instructed T-146 (and probablyT-142) to "LEAVE
135AND TDRN BACK TO [THE PATH] OF THE
ENEMY." The "135" that T-146 was told to leave
turns out not to have been an individual boat, as
earlier reported by the Marines, but the squadron
designator for the three P-4 torpedo boats which
would take part in the upcoming attack. These
three boats made up the Section 3 of Squadron
135.
(8//80 The five boats, which included the P-4
boats, T-333, T-336, and T-339, departed Hon
Me Island at about 1300G, quite possibly on their
way to seek out the Maddox/" Within the next
hour a set of apparently conflicting orders was
sent to the Vietnamese boats. At 1409G (0709Z),
Port Wallut notified both Swatow craft that the
"enemy" was a large ship bearing 125 degrees
(from My Duci') at a distance of nineteen miles at
a speed of eleven knots on a heading of twentyseven
degrees. This put the target on a north-bynortheast
heading, which matched that of the
Maddox. The same message also included a garbled
phrase to "THEN DETERMINE," but it is
unclear what this phrase meant.t'' However,
according to Edwin Moise, the North Vietnamese
said that Section 3 received its order to attack the
destroyer at 1350G. 5 1 Since the file time of the
message from Port Wallut was 1400G, this may
have been the "attack" message.
(8//81) However, there is a complicating factor.
At 1403G (0703Z), just six minutes earlier,
the site at San Miguel had copied a message from
Haiphong to the two Swatow patrol boats which
told them to "ORDER 135 NOT TO MAKE WAR
BY DAY." Furthermore, the message added that
all of the boats were ordered to head towards
shore (though an intercept of the same transmission
by the Marines at Phu Bai ordered the boats
first to pretend to head towards shore), and then
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return to Hon Me Island." Although this message
was sent shortly after 1400G (0700Z), it contains
a file time of 1203G (0503Z). This means
that this message, which constitutes an order to
recall the boats, was originated some two hours
before the order to attack was transmitted! A second
intercept of the same message added that T­
146 was supposed to order the recall of Squadron
135's torpedo boats.F' According to Moise, the
North Vietnamese claimed that a recall order was
sent after the attack message, but T-146 never
relayed it in time.P"
(8//81) This conflict in orders by command
elements from Port Wallut and Haiphong indicates
that the Vietnamese naval command had
lost control of the situation. It further suggests
that the DRV naval authority in Haiphong had
never wanted the attack to occur, at least not during
the day, when conditions were not favorable
for surprising the Maddox. Since the boats continued
their attack on the destroyer, it appears
that the recall order was ignored. The deciding
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