spartans_in_darkness

OGA
EO 1.4. (c)
lOfi SE6RE"Fh'SSMINTNX4
(V) CIA
operative
Lucien E. Conein,
the American
liaison
with Saigon's
conspiring
generals
the means to deny critical military and economic
aid if Saigon's policies did not please it, any passive
position could only be interpreted as
approval.178
(TS//SI) The generals, convinced in their own
minds that they had American approval, went
ahead with the plot. Crucial to its success was
establishing the attitudes of senior officers and
those commanding critical units or organizations.
CD) Against the background of the generals'
on-again, off-again plotting.vit seemed that the
situation in Saigon was pulling itself apart at the
seams. On the morning of 24 October, White
House, State Department, Pentagon, and CIA
officials were hit with a CIA Critic reporting an
imminent coup by a disaffected ARVN officer,
Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao!81 Thao, a former Viet
Minh officer who had rallied to Saigon in 1956,
had fallen out of favor with Diem by 1963. He had
attempted an earlier revolt in August, but had
been headed off when troops crucial to his plans
had been transferred. His current coup, planned
for that day, had been cancelled only.after much
haggling with Generals Minh and Don. The generals,
to insure his compliance, agreed to accept
Thao and his troops into their ranks. Thao's allegiance
had been always suspect: no one-was certain
how complete a break he had made with
Hanoi. Only after the war would it be revealed
that Thao had been an operative for Hanoi the
entire time!82
CD) On 22 October, General Harkins
approached one of the plot'sIeaders, General
Tran Van Don, and told himhe knew of the coup.
Interpreting this as a/disapproval by the
Americans, Don moved-to squash the coup which
had been planned for 26 October. The next day,
Don told Coneinofthe cancelled coup and asked
for reassurance from the Americans. Conein reassured
him of Washington's neutrality regarding
the COUp/80
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
TSP SEeRETHeGMI~Il'h'X4
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EO 1.4. (c)