spartans_in_darkness

EO
1.4. (c) l8P SEGRE'FHS8MIN'Fh')E1
(C//go '1111' major historiographical problem
was the dimension of the SIGl~T effort during
the American phase of the war..Just the numbers
alone suggested the size of the problem, At the
height of the American involvement.upwards of
10,000 American and allied cryptologists were
supporting the war in South Vietnam. mostly in
sites throughout Southeast Asia. A smaller ~rollP
at Fort Meade worked the SIGI:\T from NK\
headqual'lers al Forl Gl'orgl' (;. :\·Il'ade.
1\1an'land.]
-=oJ
I ~
corresponding records availublc for my research.
despite rumors of a massive dostmction of paper
records from the early 19HOs (which may han'
been partially true). were staggering: OWl'
l!)O.O()O pages in the Center for Cryptologir
History's various colleclions. and about -lOO.UOO
pages from the ~s.-\ Archives, Records Center.
and other collections (on-line and hard copy).
l luppy is the historian with such a bounty. but
cursed is Ill' in deciding what exactly lo write
about without getting mired in the bog ofso much
available detail, that. due to the nature of intelligenre.
often was conflicting,
(C;','!i1) I decided that the best way to avoid
being buried under this material was to write an
overview of American SIGINT d U1'i ng the
Indochina \\'ar. However, it would be one with a
difference: 1would concentrate on various topics
and critical incidents ofthe war. making thorn the
narrative framework for this eryptologic history.
The topics and incidents I included were an cclcctil'
collection, and required individual treatment.
Hence. this history is not the usual lincar.chronological
nurrutive. Rather, I approached each
episode in a somewhat different manner. tailoring
thl' hislorical treatment to the issue at hal1(l.
For example. the cha 1ters on the SI(;[:\T dlll'in u
thl' air war.
and the Soulh Vietnamese SIGI:\T qrg'll1izalion
pl'Obably l'ome closest to resl'ml)lirlg a ('Iassil'
hislOl'ical narratiw,
EO
1. 4. (c)
(C/ /~~I)
On the other hand. the Gulf ofTonkin
incidents and the Tet Offensive will be treated
almost likL' case studies. TIll' performance of till'
SI(;[xr system will be looked ut eritically: it will
be illustrated in both cases how critical information
was mishandled. misinterpreted. lost, or
ignored. :\llhl' same time. the nature ofthe Sl(i­
INT material. especially its effect on decisionmakers
in Saigon and Washington. required a
detailed analysis of individual reports. This
approach. at times. mav Sl'l'm to some readers
like an excruciating turn al scriptural exegesis,
Yd. the payoff is in the revelation of what was
really contained in the reports,
(U) Nul all topics of interest could be covered
in this history. This mls a decision based on St'\"­
eral factors, One was tho realization that other
cryptologic organizations were producing histories
oftheir participation in the war. OIl(' example
is the Army's Intelligence and Securitv
Command, which is working on a history of .-\S.-\
participation that emphasizes tactical 81(;1:\'1'
units. Also. I did not wunt to repeat what previous
histories haw covered. In this l'asl'. I knew thal
three volumes had been written about communications
security (COyISEC) during the war.
Although much more can he written on this
effort, it requires a volume of its own..-\ final reason
was that the impact of a topic fell out of tlutime
frame of the war..-\ good example of this is
the Prisoner of Wari:\lissing in Action
(POW/:\]IA) controversy. No other subject aflectcd
Americans as passionately as this one.
Although there had lx-on interest in the fate of
PO\\,s and :\'II:\~ during and shortly after tho war.
the peak of public attention did not occur until
the 19HOs and 19t)()s. This sad story. and till' Sll;­
1:\'1'aspecl of it. dl'Sl'I"\"l'S ils own tl>lIing.
(C//~I) Spw'lw/s is soml'thinl=!, of a departlll'e
from lhe pl'l'\"iOllS historil'~ of Sl