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(0) Giap reasoned'thatthe French position at
Dien Bien Phu was a politicaland military gamble
and one that they could ill afford with their forces
stretched out and engaged by Viet Minh forces all
over Indochina. The lack of major, mobile reinforcements
and the limited French airlift capability
(due more to a lack of trained aircrews than
from a shortage of aircraft) meant that thegarrison
there could expect little help if Giap's forces
cut them off. At the same time, Viet Minh forces
in the rest of Indochina would befree to threaten
to take control of more territory since the bulk of
Navarre's mobile forces were 'locked up in their
own fortress.
(TS//SI) Whatever the initialFrench intent at
Dien Bien Phu, their later plan to consolidate and
fortH\.' the position was in reactionto information
I
lIn November
1953,when French paratroops first were dropped
onto Dien Bien Phu as part of Operation Castor,
I
IThe
question for the French command in Hanoi was:
Were these Viet Minh units full divisions or
detached units
(0) The French commander for Indochina,
General Henri Navarre, ignored this intelligence.
He believed that the logistics support needed to
for a multidivision action was beyond the Viet
Minh capability and committed the cream of his
elite, though lightly armed, paratroop, Foreign
Legion, and colonial units to the buildup of Dien
Bien Phu. n But, Giap, who, if anything, was a
master of logistics and movement, outfoxed
(V) French
Colonial and
Foreign Legion
paratroops
during
Operation
Castor
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