spartans_in_darkness

leP 5EeRET:leaMINTJRE1
unprepared stance when the Tet attacks began at
the end of January.83
eU) Of course, not everyone discounted the
evidence of a nationwideattack. The problem for
MACV ""a.!)hmv to reconcile the obvious referencesto
a nationwide offensive with the observed
limited PAVN maneuvers in the I Corps area near
the DMZ. Some MACV staff officers ridiculed
the claims and expectations in the captured documents
as unrealistic. The very boldness of the
plan militated against its believability. The communist
claims of impending victory seemed out­
L....- ----.J landish, especially in the face of the casualty
. ,
........
... : "
,~t
PRESS RELEAS[
m. "GUV;';':UE S4IGO" .. i: .
Tltl: 92.026.92.031 United StattS Mission In Vitfnam
January s. 1960
CAP'nJRBD IXlCUIENT IlfDICATBS FINAL NIASE or REVOLUTION AT HAND
(V) 5
J~nu~ty
press
release
Subordinate level Collllunht party activists of the Nallonal LIt-erst l"n
Front fore•• are ::'01n:. told that the f1nll1 phaae ot the rftOh.tiOftRry war 1n
- 11 -
Action to be tnken: Usa very stron; 1lI111tary IIttncles rn c;)CrtllnAtilln
with the uprislfl8s of the loed pop\ll:lUon to take CWlt'r t.l"n5 ancl cillt.'s.
Troops should flood the lowl3nds. They should IIkIVe tc·wnrd l1berot ina thu
capital city /-So.1.on 7, take pcwer ond try to rally enol:l1 l:.rl;':Rclcs lind
re~lr.lent. to QUI' s1d.-one by on". Pr;;>pllr.:\IIda sh,"~uld be bro::.dly 1:!lsswcllln"teL1
RII10R:.< the population 111 aenoral, r.nd lcafluts should !)u used t.~ r"ach ~11t."")"
officers and onllated porsonnol. n,e above lIubJQct ebould be fully und~r.t~
by cadre and troups; b.Nevllfr, our brothers should not s:\1 that thls "reSllr
cOlles frOlll the Pnrty and Unci. j-Ho Chi Minh 7, but to say 1t C'Hn•• f""" th..
/-L1LeraUon_7 Front. Also, donot speclty tll11ee fJr lJllplulII"ntntion.
W-..' •• 4~_. Frow 1 DecemL.r on, all un1ts should takllf the lnltlr.tlv8 to
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