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painted a grrm picture of the situation III
Indochina.
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CD) On 26 March, when the group reported to
President Johnson, they recommended against
Westmoreland's troop increase. Furthermore,
they suggested it was time to begin disengaging
from Vietnam. Their recommendations were seconded
by a special Department of Defense study
which saw no end to the conflict, even with all of
the reinforcements demanded by Westmoreland.
It is likely that the assessment from the Wise Men
heavily influenced President Johnson's decision
to seek to negotiate nezoti a way out 0 f the war. 206
CD) On 31 March, President Johnson
announced a partial cessation to the bombing of
North Vietnam and his desire to open negotiations
with Hanoi. He also shocked the nation by
announcing his refusal to seek reelection. In a
way, the course of the war had turned a corner;
but getting out would be a long and bloody affair.
(U)Notes
1. (U) Lt. Col. Dave Richard Palmer (USA),
Readings in Current Military History (West Point,
NY: Department of Military Art and Engineering,
USMA, 1969), 103-104.
2. (U) Harold Ford, 105.
3. (U) Davidson, 480.
4. (TS//SI) Oral History Interview with Milt
Zaslow, conducted by Thomas Johnson and Charles
Baker, OH-17-93 14, September 1993, 34.
5. (:"J//:"JI) I I"Uncertain Origins,"
Dragon Seeds, Vol. 1 No.5, December 1972, 13.
6. (U) Harold Ford, 113.
7. (U) Ibid., 116.
8. (TSNSI ~JF) Interim Report, "Intelligence
Warning of the Tet offensive in South Vietnam," SC­
09340-68,5 April 1968, CCH Series VIII, Box 19.
9. (U) James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive:
Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, NY, and London:
Cornell University Press, 1991), 259 .
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