spartans_in_darkness

Tap SEeRETNeaMunilX 1 '·EO 1. 4. (d)
Representative in Saigon assured.hinrthat a "sanitized"
tour could.be-accomplished, as long as
I could ~:\~2~i;~a:::r~~:~:~~7~tionst1~:~~~~:
variety of reasons - among others, J7's limited
resources, capabilities, and budget problems ­
the plan was unrealistic. NSA suggested that if he
was insistent on doing this that he should try to
implement the plan in a series of phasesbeginning
with the tactical units and ending with a
transition to a natioQnl c tologic organization.
124 Of course, wha vas not informed
of was that the United tates, or sometime, had
considered the idea of such an organization as
"inimical" to its cryptologic interests, that the
development of a Vietnamese/national cryptologic
capability would seriously affect U.S. SIGINT
and COMSEC positionsin Vietnam.l'"
(Ts//snl
~id go ahead with one part of
his plan, whIch was to provide direct divisionlevel
COMINT support to the ARVN. These support
units would be known as ARVN Special
Technical Detachments, or ASTDs. Each ARVN
division was to have one of these support cornpa-
units was
nies. Actually, the formation of these
not a new idea. Back in 1961, one part of the
USASA OPLAN 8-61 called for the formation of
a COMINT support company made
up of five support platoons which
were to have the capability of
search, intercept, translation,
D/F, and reporting of plaintext,
tactical communist communications.
These units were to be selfsufficient
and able to accompany
their ARVN host units anywhere.
126
Vietnamese ASTDs had the dual mission of providing
directSIGINT support to its host division,
.:v.:"e.:l...l.a.....s~upporng Ts e~"o."""""""""rts in Saigon. In
a.:".s November .\ 1968, received approval from
the Vietnamese enera Staff-to begin forming
.
theASTDs. His plan called for-setting up ten of
these detachments, each manned by four officers
and fifty-six enlisted personnel. In turn, these
ASTDs were further broken down into low-level
intercept teams of four enlisted 'personnel and
NCOs. Each ASTD would support their host division's
COMINT needs through intercept, D/F,
processing, and reporting of intelligence derived
from communist communications.
(TS//Si) Like everything else with
Vietnamese communications intelligence, too few
experienced and trained personnel, as well as a
lack of equipment, hampered the ASTD start-up.
The first detachment, assigned the AR\lN's best
combat division, the 1st, did not arrive until July
of 1969. Even at that, the ASTD was not\consid- DGA
ered ready for operations]
\
(TS//SI) The ASTDs were modeled
after the highly successful ASA
direct support units which were
attached to each U.S. Army division
and brigade in Vietnam, such
as the 1st Infantry Division's 337th
Radio Research Company. The
(U) Some ofthe personnel ofthe 1stARVN Special
Technlcal Detachment intercept team
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